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ABSTRACT 
Despite dire predictions from the federal government, academia, and private 
research institutions about the threat posed by nuclear and radiological terrorism, the 
federal government has yet to develop an overarching organizational framework to 
collectively plan and prepare for the horrendous consequences of such an attack.  In 
addition, the federal government has yet to develop even a modest program to provide 
technical planning and preparedness assistance to those local officials charged with 
coordinating the response to nuclear or radiological terrorism – the local emergency 
manager.  In order to reduce the loss of life, social panic, and the direct and indirect 
economic loss caused by a nuclear or radiological terror attack, the federal government 
should pursue the creation of a suite of strategic national and regional organizational 
innovations designed explicitly to prepare our nation’s emergency management 
community and other first responders for their critical roles during a large-scale 
radiological response.  First amongst these innovations should be the promulgation of a 
new Homeland Security Presidential Directive establishing a Domestic Nuclear 
Preparedness Office.  Such organizational improvements, coupled with an aggressive 
field-level technical assistance planning, training, and exercise outreach campaign, will 
enable the United States to build a sophisticated and coordinated nuclear and radiological 
terrorism preparedness and response system. 
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In the fall of 1999, the Hart-Rudman Commission finished a year-long assessment 
of the gravest near and long-term threats to American national security.  At the very top 
of this list was nuclear terrorism.1  Given the profusion of readily obtainable radioactive 
“loose sources” throughout the world and stockpiles of poorly controlled fissionable 
nuclear materials located in failing nation-states, it is no wonder that the national security 
experts convened under Hart-Rudman rated nuclear terrorism as our country’s most 
significant threat.2  A threat, which should be noted, was acknowledged before the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and before the initiation of the global war on 
terror. 
A nuclear terrorism attack would likely come in one of two forms of ionizing 
radiation weapons.  The first method would be as a rudimentary conventional explosive 
“salted” with quantities of a radioactive isotope.  This type of weapon is referred to as a 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD).  An RDD would not be very destructive, but 
would create panic, terror, and substantial direct and indirect economic loss.3  The second 
type of weapon in the nuclear terrorists’ arsenal would be an Improvised Nuclear Device 
(IND).  Incredibly more destructive than an RDD, an IND would involve the fissioning of 
the isotopes of either Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239 leading to critical mass and a 
nuclear explosion.  An IND would be incredibly powerful, depending on the yield, 
creating blast, heat, and radiation effects that could kill thousands, perhaps even millions. 
According to the “National Strategy for Homeland Security” the primary goal of 
the American government is to prevent a terrorist attack (in this context an IND or RDD 
                                                 
1 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase 1 Report: New World Coming: 
American Security in the 21st Century. September 1999. 
2 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey: Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004). 270-275. 
3 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism: 
Radiological Weapons as a Means of Attack. September 2000. 172. 
2 
attack) from occurring.4  However, as a society, we must prepare for the contingency that 
such prevention efforts may fail, and terrorists may indeed detonate one of these weapons 
in an American city.  If such an attack were to occur, one category of responder would be 
at the very hub of the incident response – the local emergency manager.  For it is the job 
of the emergency manager to coordinate the activities of all first responders, to quickly 
report needs to the state, and to communicate protective action recommendations quickly 
and effectively to elected officials, the media, and the public.  In the first critical hours 
following an RDD/IND attack, the local emergency management director will be in 
charge of managing a spatially vast, technically complex, and temporally urgent response 
largely on his/her own with little assistance from Federal response authorities.5 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Top-Officials (TOPOFF) II Exercise held in Seattle in May 2003, evaluated 
local, state and federal government response to the detonation, by a terrorist group, of a 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) in downtown Seattle.  According to the official 
After Action Report, the results of this exercise showed a general lack of knowledge of 
the technical side of radiological response operations amongst the city of Seattle and 
King County emergency management staff and other exercise participants including fire 
departments and hospitals.6 This paucity of understanding of the technical information 
concerning the many aspects of large-scale radiological response and recovery is 
particularly disconcerting given that both the city of Seattle and King County are 
renowned for having a very sophisticated emergency management program. 
                                                 
4 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security. July 2000. 2. 
5 The vast majority of Federal and State radiological response resources and incident management 
teams will not arrive at the incident for at least 6 to 24 hours following an IND/RDD attack.  See the 
power-point presentation entitled “Overview of DOE/NNSA Nuclear/Radiological Response,” presented 
by Department of Energy officials from the Nevada Operations Office during the 2005 National 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Annual Conference, Dallas, Texas. April 2000. 
6 As one King County Emergency Operations Center participant stated, “translating technical data on 
radiation into meaningful ‘so-what’ terms and coordinating this was difficult.  It took us three days to find 
someone decision-makers could understand.” Department of Homeland Security, Top Officials (TOPOFF) 
Exercise Series: TOPOFF-2 After Action Report. August 2003. 168. 
3 
But this apparent lack of knowledge is not restricted to Puget Sound emergency 
management officials.  From conversations with both local and state emergency 
management officials from all types of communities at conferences, meetings, and local 
exercises one cannot help but notice the frustration and general sense of discomfort that 
local emergency managers have when it comes to planning, preparing for, and responding 
to an RDD/IND event in their jurisdiction.   
Although many local and state emergency managers have had some radiological 
awareness training or even some technical schooling on the topic, much of this training 
appears to have focused on transportation accidents involving radioactive sources.7  
While important, this type of event impacts a relatively confined area and a limited 
number of people, whereas the spatial extent and the scope of an RDD/IND response 
would be orders-of-magnitude larger. 
Some of the angst that appears to grip local emergency managers in regards to 
large-scale radiological response operations may have to do with the lack of education 
and information on non-transportation related radiological emergencies (i.e., RDD and/or 
IND events).  Part of this research was to test these assumptions.  Are local emergency 
managers truly unknowledgeable in planning and executing a large-scale radiological 
response? If so, what are the reasons behind this lack of knowledge?  Is one reason the 
lack of understanding of the “big picture” and the various, complicated “steps” in a large-
scale response?  Is it the lack of understanding of the types of federal radiological 
response assets, their organization, and capacities?  Is it a lack of technical knowledge 
regarding the physics and terminology of radiation? 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the emergency management community began to 
move away from its traditional role in “civil emergency preparedness” (CEP); the term 
used to describe the preparation of civilian government and citizens for the effects of 
nuclear war.  As early as 1978, CEP officials were bemoaning the “drifting with regard to 
                                                 
7 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Compendium of Federal Terrorism Training for State and 
Local Audiences. April 10, 2002. 
4 
CEP, drifting downward from an emphasis to a non-emphasis.”8  With Cold War threats 
easing and catastrophic natural disasters increasing, by the 1990’s natural hazards 
(floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, etc.) had become the sine qua non of the 
emergency management profession.  In the intervening two decades, much of the 
knowledge of radiological weapons emergencies had been lost or forgotten as a new 
generation of emergency managers entered the profession. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary assumption underpinning this research is that the local emergency 
manager is the primary coordinator of response efforts in the event of an RDD or IND 
attack by terrorists or a nation-state.  Although the federal government has a host of 
specialized teams and assets that would be brought to bear in the immediate aftermath of 
such an attack, most of these assets would not arrive for several hours, and in some cases, 
several days.9  Therefore, virtually the entire initial response to an RDD/IND attack 
would be the responsibility of the local emergency manager to coordinate and direct.  
Because of this, it is imperative that emergency managers (especially in America’s 
largest urban areas) understand the many components and intricacies of large-scale 
nuclear or radiological response operations.10 
The second assumption driving this research is that the federal government has 
the quintessential responsibility for preparing all levels of government for a response to a 
nuclear or radiological weapons attack.  While local and state governments are 
undoubtedly responsible for preparing their respective jurisdictions for an RDD/IND 
attack and all other forms of disasters, only the federal government has been given the 
                                                 
8 General Services Administration (GSA), Civil Emergency Preparedness, National Security and 
Strategic Deterrence: A Report on the Federal Preparedness Agency Symposium held January 18-20, 1978. 
July 1978. iii. 
9 DOE, “Overview of DOE/NNSA Nuclear/Radiological Response”. 
10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Office of Civil Defense (OCD).  Principal 
Threats Facing Communities and Local Emergency Management Coordinators. 1990. 
5 
mandate via legislation and national-level plans to assist communities with 
nuclear/radiological and all-hazards disaster preparedness and response.11 
Given these assumptions and the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism outlined 
in the next Chapter, this research project sought to: 
• Understand the current federal government bureaucratic organizational 
structure with respect to radiological and nuclear preparedness and 
planning, and identify any shortcomings in these organizational constructs 
that are hindering effective radiological preparedness assistance to local 
emergency management officials.  In other words, are there better ways to 
organize our national government to prepare all levels of government for 
the consequences of a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack? 
• Ascertain the perceived level of knowledge of large-scale radiological 
response operations that local emergency managers feel they possess.  Do 
local emergency managers know very little on the subject or are they well-
versed?  
• Assess the degree in which local emergency managers believe they need 
information on large-scale (RDD/IND) radiological response operations.  
Are they comfortable in the knowledge they have, or are they desirous for 
more information? 
• Identify the kinds of information on large-scale radiological response 
operations required by the local emergency manager.  In other words, 
what would they prefer?  Would it be: General or detailed publications and 
guidebooks; briefings on federal radiological response assets, teams, and 
operations from Federal authorities like the Department of Energy (DOE), 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and others; training modules 
on “big picture” operations; and/or, more narrowly-focused operations 
(i.e., medical treatment of contaminated patients, congregate care, 
survey/monitoring, plume modeling, etc.); or, the need for exercises and 
drills of various levels of size and complexity, etc. 
In sum, the primary questions under consideration are:   
• Is the federal government adequately organized to thoroughly support the 
needs of the local emergency management community with respect to 
nuclear and radiological terrorism preparedness and response?  If not, 
what organizational constructs could the federal government either create 
or refine that would aid emergency managers in preparing their 
communities for the consequences of an RDD or IND terrorist attack?  
                                                 
11 The very creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department’s oversight role of 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD)-5 and HSPD-8 is testament to the federal government’s 
leadership role in protecting all American citizens from the consequences of WMD attacks.    
6 
• Is the federal government providing the appropriate training, education, 
and outreach materials to prepare local emergency managers for their 
respective roles in managing the consequences of a radiological/nuclear 
(RDD/IND) terror attack?  If not, what actions should the federal 
government take to improve RDD/IND response operations knowledge 
amongst emergency management and homeland security officials, 
particularly in America’s largest cities?  
A few additional points regarding the objectives of this research: First, a local 
concern that was not addressed in this research project was radiological equipment needs.  
Although there is a need for radiological survey instruments and monitors at the local 
level used by fire departments, hazardous materials teams, and medical professionals, this 
a whole other realm of RDD/IND emergency response that would be better addressed by 
more thorough and focused research.  Since the target of this research, the local 
emergency management director/coordinator (emergency manager), is primarily a 
coordinative person and not a field-operator, the need for information on pre-disaster 
preparedness and post-disaster response processes and procedures outweighed the 
necessity to understand the need for radiological equipment procurement and training.  
Second, this research focused solely on the organizational changes and 
radiological preparedness outreach products that the federal government should pursue to 
assist the emergency management community.  While privately-owned and public critical 
infrastructure sectors and local and state emergency services, public health, 
environmental quality, and others have an important role in assisting local emergency 
management agencies with RDD/IND preparedness issues, in order to narrow the focus 
of this research, only the federal government’s role in these efforts was analyzed. 
Finally, for the purposes of this research, the term “outreach” and “information 
needs” used throughout this document denote the use of publications, guidebooks, 
compact-disks, web-sites, briefings, and various drills and exercises designed explicitly 
to improve the ability of emergency management officials to prepare for and respond 




D. HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
The ultimate goal of this research project is a practical one: to aid in the process 
of strengthening the emergency management community’s ability to coordinate the 
response to an RDD or IND attack in their community.  In order to accomplish this goal, 
it must first be determined what the local emergency manager does not know about large-
scale radiological response, and equally important, what the local emergency manager 
thinks he/she needs to know about large-scale radiological response.  Once data on these 
two fundamental questions are gleaned, this information can be used by federal (and 
state) authorities to design an effective RDD/IND response information-outreach 
campaign targeted at the local emergency manager. 
Under the Nuclear/Radiological Response Annex to the National Response Plan 
(NRP) the Department of Energy (DOE) is the Coordinating (or Lead) Agency in the 
federal response to a nuclear terrorism event.  Once the response phase has shifted into 
the recovery phase, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) takes on the 
Coordinating Agency role.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Regional Response Coordination 
Center (RRCC) has the responsibility for overall coordination of the federal response.12 
Although the EPA controls some federal radiological response assets (like the 
Radiological Emergency Response Team), and DHS/FEMA has overall coordination, it is 
the DOE that owns the preponderance of federal radiological response teams and 
resources.  Assets like the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center 
(FRMAC) in Nevada are composed of several-dozen highly skilled health-physicist 
personnel expertly trained in various components of radiological response operations.  It 
is the FRMAC that, once established near the incident scene, will be the center of the 
response and recovery operations following an RDD/IND attack.13  Other assets from the 
DOE like the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC)(now the 
                                                 
12 Department of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan (NRP), Nuclear/Radiological 
Incident Annex. December 2004. 
13 Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, “Overview of Federal Radiological 
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Operations,”  presented by Department of Energy officials 
from the Nevada Operations Office during the 2005 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
Annual Conference, Dallas, Texas (April 2000). 
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Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center under DHS), the Aerial 
Measuring System (AMS), and the eight Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Teams 
will fall under the FRMAC once established. 
Currently DOE personnel with the FRMAC participate in required periodic 
nuclear power plant emergency exercises with state and local officials.  Because of this, 
local emergency managers in communities adjacent to commercial nuclear power plants 
understand FRMAC and DOE response procedures and have a solid understanding of all 
of the components of a large-scale radiological response.  However, local emergency 
managers not located in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a commercial nuclear 
power plant, which is most communities in the United States, have little or no interaction 
with the DOE, FRMAC or other elements of the federal radiological response apparatus. 
(See Chapter VI, Section A-3).  Due to this, many local emergency management agencies 
may be struggling to understand the federal government’s role in the rather complex 
activities inherent in an RDD/IND response. 
E. RESEARCH AUDIENCE 
Since the DOE and DOE-FRMAC is the primary source of technical expertise and 
controls the preponderance of assets in the aftermath of a radiological emergency, it will 
be one of the primary audiences for this research.  So too will the FEMA Response 
Directorate and the soon-to-be re-aligned Preparedness Directorate,14 as well as the DHS 
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, since these agencies provide pre-event 
training services and incident response support to state and local governments during a 
major disaster.  But states and other federal agencies involved in training for and/or 
organizing large-scale radiological response operations should also benefit from this 
research.  These agencies/departments include: the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department 
                                                 
14 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (HR 5441) signed by President 
Bush on October 3, 2006, transfers many of the functions of the DHS Preparedness Directorate over to 
FEMA.  The reorganizations mandated in this legislation are to become effective March 31, 2007.  See the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, HR 5441, Title VIII – National Emergency 
Management. 
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of Defense (DoD).  Finally, it is hoped that the Homeland Security Council (HSC) will 
benefit from this research, since several of the recommendations herein can only be 
executed by the most senior policy organizations of the federal government.  
With the data provided in this research, it is hoped that the HSC, DHS, FEMA, 
DOE, and others will be able to: establish priorities for action; designate lead agencies or 
subcommittees to pursue and implement the recommendations outlined in this research; 
scrutinize the progress made in accomplishing mission goals; and, over time, monitor the 
effectiveness of each of the recommendations that is ultimately implemented. 
10 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, there has been a heightened interest in 
the need for the federal government to assist the local first responder community in 
preparing for future WMD attacks.  In 2003, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (better 
known as the Gilmore Commission Report) addressed the “shortcomings in state and 
local empowerment.”  The Commission asked the question, “if local responders are in 
fact our first line of defense, have we [the Federal government] succeeded in effectively 
empowering and enhancing state and local capabilities?”15  This research project 
endeavors to answers this question vis-à-vis federal support to the emergency 
management community with regards to assistance in preparing for a response to an RDD 
or IND-induced disaster. 
Although there is general agreement that nuclear/radiological terrorism is a 
significant threat and the human health, economic, and psychological effects of such an 
attack would be extraordinary, there are no training courses or outreach materials on 
responding to large-scale radiological emergencies geared specifically towards the local 
emergency manager.  This is important because in the initial hours following an 
RDD/IND attack, the local emergency manager will be the primary manager/coordinator 
of the response operation.  Furthermore, no studies currently exist that seek to ascertain 
what local emergency managers know about large-scale radiological response operations, 
or what they think they need to know or want to know about this most serious and 
complicated type of emergency. 
 
 
                                                 
15 RAND Corporation, “The Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing our Homeland, Preserving our Liberty. (Arlington, VA: 
December 15, 2003), 5. 
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B. THE NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREAT 
In recent years much has been written about the growing threat of terrorists’ use 
of ionizing radiation weapons against civilian and/or military targets (i.e., nuclear 
terrorism).  One of the most compelling works on this topic is Charles D. Ferguson and 
William C. Potter’s “The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism,” in which the authors outline 
four mechanisms by which terrorists could use existing civilian or military radiological 
assets around the world against the United States: (1) they could buy or steal a 
functioning tactical nuclear weapon; (2) they could buy or steal fissile material (U-235 or 
P-239) and fabricate a nuclear fission weapon (i.e., an Improvised Nuclear Device 
(IND)); (3) they could attack and breach the reactor containment vessel of a commercial 
nuclear power plant releasing large amounts of radiation; and, (4) they could acquire 
industrial and/or medical radioactive isotopes and detonate it with conventional 
explosives (i.e., a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)).16  Although Ferguson and 
Potter steer clear of prognostications regarding the likelihood of terrorist’s use of an RDD 
or IND, they seem to be one of the few voices calling for increased RDD/IND response 
and recovery preparations as the most effective risk-reduction technique instead of the 
much more frequent call to secure “loose sources.”17 
The possibility of terrorists’ use of any of the four means of nuclear terror 
outlined by Potter and Ferguson is a topic hotly debated by national security and 
terrorism experts.  Giving credence to the argument that terrorists, and specifically Al 
Queda, are developing IND/RDD weapons can be found in documents uncovered in 
Afghanistan which include crude drawings of an implosion-type nuclear weapon and 
bomb designs for RDDs.18  Much of this information has subsequently become public 
and several reputable news organizations (i.e., CNN, The Times of London, the Wall 
Street Journal, etc.) have reported on the contents of these documents seized by American 
                                                 
16 Ferguson, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, 3. 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 David Albright, “Al Queda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” 
Nautilus Institute Special Forum 47 (Nautilus Institute, November 6, 2002) 
http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html (accessed October 22, 
2005). 
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forces following the defeat of the Taliban in 2002.  David Albright outlines a number of 
examples of these documents, but his statement that “if Al Queda had remained in 
Afghanistan, it would have likely acquired nuclear weapons eventually” seems a bit too 
matter-of-fact given the bits of information he was privy to.19  Other terrorism experts 
like William Rosenau and Greg Treverton are a bit more sanguine about Al Queda’s 
ability to acquire and use radiological or nuclear weapons.  In a 2003 interview, Rosenau 
and Treverton downplay Al Queda’s ability and willingness to acquire Weapons of Mass 
Destruction due primarily to the risk involved in acquiring such weapons especially when 
existing conventional weapons are so cheap and effective.20  Despite some 
disagreements, however, a survey conducted of over 80 leading nuclear proliferation 
experts by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005 found that the near-term risk of a radiological 
(RDD) attack is significantly higher than the risk of a nuclear (IND) attack.21 
C. TYPES OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND THEIR 
EFFECTS 
Nuclear weapons have only been used twice on civilian populations: in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945.  Well over 120,000 people were killed during and 
immediately after the attacks.  The nuclear bombs dropped on these cities had yields of 
about twelve-kilotons (KT) and twenty-two KTs, respectively.  Modern strategic nuclear 
weapons possessed by several nations usually have yields between one-hundred KT to 
one megaton.22  In addition, most of these same nations possess thousands of shorter-
range “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons with yields under 
                                                 
19 David Albright, “Al Queda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” 
Nautilus Institute Special Forum 47 (Nautilus Institute, November 6, 2002) 
http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html (accessed October 22, 
2005). 1. 
20 Jamie Glazov, “Symposium: Diagnosing Al Queda,” Frontpagemag.com (August 18, 2003) 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=9416 (accessed November 5, 2005).  William 
Rosenau is a political scientist with RAND, and Greg Treverton served as the Vice Chair of the National 
Intelligence Council. 
21 In the survey, respondents gave the average estimate of risk of an RDD attack over the next 10 year 
period as being 40 percent; this was twice as high as the average estimate for an IND attack.  See Richard 
G. Lugar, “The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses,” (Washington, D.C.: June, 2005). 
22. 
22 A one megaton nuclear explosion is one-hundred times more powerful than a ten kiloton detonation. 
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10KT are considered to be tactical or low-yield weapons.  Most planning assumptions for 
terrorist’s use of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) involve a low-yield weapon.  
Research on the effects of a low-yield IND detonated in an urban area is in 
agreement that most of the injuries would be caused by the explosion, shock wave and 
fires rather than by radiation. Although modeling the number of deaths and injuries 
caused by such an attack is difficult, Barnaby provides a well documented estimation that 
a low-yield tactical IND of one kiloton would likely cause one-hundred percent fatalities 
within one-mile of the detonation.23   
Unlike a nuclear weapon, a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or “Dirty 
Bomb” is simply a conventional explosive that has been wrapped or “salted” with a 
radioactive source.  Although no critical mass is achieved (i.e., no nuclear explosion), an 
RDD given the right atmospheric conditions could disperse radioactive material over a 
rather large area.  Radioactive materials used in an RDD can be found in countless 
industrial and medical applications from weld inspection equipment to food bacteria 
killers, and from oil exploration probes to cancer cell destroying radiotherapy 
machines.24 Although there are millions of commercial radiation sources worldwide only 
a fraction contain enough curies (energy) and possess the portability and dispersability to 
make effective RDD sources.25 
While there is general agreement on the scale of destruction for various sized 
yields caused by an IND, the magnitude of the impacts caused by an RDD are matters of 
some contention.  Some of these post-RDD attack studies like those developed by the 
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) paint a rather grim picture of “a swath about 
one mile long covering an area of forty city blocks that would exceed EPA contamination 
limits…if decontamination were not possible, these areas would have to be abandoned 
                                                 
23 Frank Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb, (New York: Nation Books, 2004). 30. 
24 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Homeland Defense: Asymmetric Warfare 
and Terrorism, Radiological Weapons as a Means of Attack” (September 2000). 172. 
25 Charles D. Ferguson, et al., Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks (March, 
2003). http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1909.pdf (accessed October 18, 2006). 24. 
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for decades.”26  However, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission “took issue with the 
consequences to public health and the extent of the contamination [caused by an RDD] 
predicted by the Federation of American Scientist study.”27  The NRC believes that the 
FAS study exaggerates both the spatial extent of contamination caused by an RDD and 
the level of contamination.   
Regardless of their effectiveness in producing mass casualties or denying area use 
through contamination, the real threat, as John Ford summarizes it would be the 
tremendous psychological – and therefore – political impact of an RDD.28  John Medalia 
describes how terrorists understand these psychological effects and therefore more highly 
value RDDs as a terror weapon.29 
D. THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGER IN 
NUCLEAR/RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
The role of the local emergency manager in an IND or RDD response operation 
needs to be inferred from general documents on the discipline since little has been 
published directly on the topic.  The exception to this is a brief one-page paper published 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that outlines the various duties 
of the local emergency manager in coordinating the response to an IND or RDD attack.30  
These duties include: 
• Surveying and Monitoring – Ensuring hazmat teams and others are 
delineating the scope and dose rate of the radioactive plume and 
coordinating with state and federal survey teams on monitoring locations 
and dose assessment. 
                                                 
26 Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President Federation of American Scientists before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, based on a cesium-based RDD with 10-lbs of TNT (March 6, 2002). 
http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/kelly_testimony_030602.pdf (accessed October 22, 2005). 
27 Canadian American Strategic Review, “An Assessment of the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: Dirty 
Bombs or Radiation Dispersal Devices (Part 3)”. http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-frost3.htm (accessed September 
21, 2005). 
28 James Ford, “Radiological Dispersal Devices, Assessing the Transnational Threat.” Strategic Forum 
Number 136, (National Defense University: March 1998) 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF136/forum136.hmtl (accessed November 5, 2005). 
29 John Medalia, “Terrorist Dirty-Bombs: A Brief Primer” (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, 2004).  
30 Excerpted from a handout entitled, “Top-Ten Nuclear/Radiological Disaster Response Activities,” 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 10 (date unknown). 
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• Plume Predictive Modeling – Getting a hold of an accurate and agreed-
upon plume model to make protective action recommendations to local 
elected officials. 
• Protective Action Decisions – Quickly analyzing the situation and data to 
make a determination on ordering sheltering or evacuation for affected 
citizens. 
• Reception Center and Congregate Care – Establishing and equipping 
monitoring centers to check vehicles and people for contamination, and 
providing temporary housing to displaced evacuees. 
• Decontamination – Setting-up decontamination stations for both vehicles 
and people. 
• Medical Response – Analyzing the need of the local medical community 
for assistance and transmitting this need to state authorities for assistance. 
• Agricultural Advisories and Food Control Area operations – If impacted 
by fallout, issuing agricultural advisories to farmers, ranchers, and 
gardeners, and possibly establish means to quarantine food crops. 
• Re-entry and Return decisions – Working closely with state and federal 
authorities on guidelines and procedures to allow people to temporarily or 
permanently return to the disaster impacted area. 
• Public Information and Warning – Ensuring the public is getting 
straightforward and timely instructions on what protective actions to take. 
• First Responder Safety – Ensuring first responders have appropriate 
dosimetry to gauge exposure and the means to document and track it. 
• Fear Management – Closely aligned with public information; working to 
ensure that public panic is minimized. 
FEMAs Independent Study Course on the Emergency Manager provides a 
succinct overview of the general duties of the local emergency manager that are germane 
to all disasters including IND and RDD attacks.  According to FEMA the local 
emergency manager is “responsible for coordinating the various components of the 
emergency management system – fire and police, emergency medical services, public 




emergencies.”31 Since all of these first responder components would be critical to an 
RDD/IND response, the paramount role of the emergency manager in the aftermath of an 
RDD/IND attack is self-evident. 
E. CURRENT RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE OPERATIONS TRAINING 
AND INFORMATION 
There is a substantial and widely-varying quantity of radiological training courses 
offered by governments at every level, as well as by universities and private contractors.  
Since the preponderance of these courses are conducted and/or sponsored by federal 
agencies, understanding the breadth of courses offered by the federal government 
provides the best insight into the kinds of RDD/IND response training courses that are 
being offered, their focus, and their target audiences.  These courses provide an insight 
into the federal government’s perspective on what is important information for local first 
responders and others to have especially post-9/11. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s “Compendium of Federal 
Terrorism Training” provides an overview of each of the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) response courses conducted by the Department of Defense, the Department of 
Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and various elements within the Department of 
Homeland Security to include FEMA and the National Nuclear Security 
Administration.32  An analysis of the types of WMD courses listed in this compendium 
dealing specifically with nuclear/radiological response operations shows that the majority 
of these courses are geared towards transportation accidents involving radiological 
materials and are not oriented towards large-scale radiological operations involving an 
IND or RDD.  It should be noted, however, that this FEMA “Compendium” was 
published in 2002, so it likely does not reflect the re-orientation in first responder training 
that evolved following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 
                                                 
31 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Independent Study Course-1, Emergency Manager: An 
Orientation to the Position. (Emmitsburg, MD: Emergency Management Institute, 1998), 
www.training.fema.gov, (accessed September 18, 2005). 
32 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Compendium of Federal Terrorism Training For State 
and Local Audiences,” (Emergency Management Institute, April 10, 2002). 
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The best summary of current IND/RDD-oriented training courses can be found in 
the “ODP WMD Training Program” publication.  Similar to the FEMA “Compendium”, 
this document published by the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within DHS 
lists and describes fifty-two WMD training courses conducted by sixteen separate 
institutions.33  The training courses are logically segregated into three distinct parts based 
on the “level” of training: awareness level training, performance level training, and 
planning/management level.  For each level a matrix is provided to depict which courses 
are the most germane to which first responder discipline (i.e., fire service, law 
enforcement, emergency medical services, etc.).  In the “Emergency Management 
Agency” category a total of thirty-one of the WMD courses are listed as having some 
applicability to emergency management professionals.  However, scrutinizing this list of 
courses finds that only three or four are specifically geared towards nuclear/radiological 
operations.  The majority of the courses for emergency managers are general WMD 
courses dealing with incident command issues or other command-and-control type topics.          
The few courses that are geared specifically to radiological response operations 
only explore certain pieces of the operational continuum (i.e., treatment of contaminated 
individuals, or radiological monitoring).  A single course that encapsulates all of the 
pieces of a large-scale radiological response operation simply does not exist.  One of the 
goals of this research was to ascertain whether local emergency managers believe the 
development of such a course to be worthwhile. 
F. PREVIOUS SURVEYS TO EMERGENCY MANAGERS ON 
RADIOLOGICAL DISASTER TRAINING 
As the preceding section underscores, there are a great number of training courses 
offered by multiple parties concerning radiological safety, response and recovery 
                                                 
33 Department of Homeland Security, Office For Domestic Preparedness “ODP WMD Training 
Program, Enhancing State and Local Capabilities to Respond to Incidents of Terrorism”. (Washington 
D.C.: 2004). 
Ten of these are federal government agencies while the remainder are either universities or private 
firms under contract to ODP (now the Office of Grants and Training) to provide WMD training for local 
and state officials.  For a detailed explanation of the role of Universities in delivering WMD courses see the 
Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, “The National Domestic 
Preparedness Consortium” at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm. 
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operations.  Despite all of these courses, it appears that no one has asked the local 
emergency management community about their needs concerning training, outreach 
materials, and technical assistance on radiological response operations especially as it 
relates to RDD/IND disasters.   
The nearest attempt at ascertaining this information was in a survey of emergency 
managers conducted by the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) in 
2004.34  In its survey of approximately 108 Certified Emergency Managers (CEM), 
IAEM queried respondents on what they believed to be the most important courses 
emergency managers should take.  Of the top twenty “core courses” listed by the 
respondents only one, “Weapons of Mass Destruction” had any direct connection to 
radiological response operations.  Most of the other courses deemed critical by 
emergency managers were general in nature dealing with running an Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) or understanding the Incident Command System (ICS). 
In March 2004, the State of Washington forwarded a comprehensive 
questionnaire to the state’s emergency managers “to collect information on local 
emergency management programs in order to develop a snapshot of the broader, 
statewide system of emergency management in Washington State.”35  Although quite 
thorough, this survey had a broad focus on the entire gamut of emergency operations and 
did not explicitly address RDD/IND response training issues.  In 2003, Rodriquez, et al 
conducted a survey of seventy-two local emergency managers and other officials 
involved in disaster preparedness activities in the State of Oklahoma.36  However, this 
survey was limited only to emergency managers’ use of weather information and radar 
technology in supporting their operations.  
                                                 
34 Daryl Spiewak, “The Top 10 Core Competancies and Courses as Selected by Practicing Emergency 
Managers.” International Association of Emergency Managers, http://www.iaem.com (accessed September 
19, 2005). 
35 Washington State Governor’s Emergency Management Council Task Force on Local Programs, 
“Study of State Emergency Management at the Local Program Level,” (Olympia, WA, March 2004). 
36 Havidan Rodriguez, Bill Donner, and Walter Diaz, “A Survey of Emergency Management 
Organizations in Oklahoma,” 
http://www.udel.edu/DRC/current_projects/A%20Survey%20of%20Emergency%20Management%20Orga
nizations%20in%20Oklahoma.ppt (accessed October 21, 2005). 
20 
In sum, no surveys of local emergency managers have been conducted to gauge 
their knowledge of large-scale radiological response operations (IND/RDD events) and 
their wishes regarding training courses, briefings, outreach materials, or technical 
assistance on the topic. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. SAMPLE SELECTION 
In order to fulfill one of the primary objectives of this research, specific data and 
information from local emergency management directors within the United States was 
collected via an Internet (Web-based) survey.  The following is the sample frame for this 
research which consists of the emergency management directors in the largest 75 cities in 
the United States based on the FY2005 list of cities participating in the Urban Areas 
Security Initiative (UASI) program and an additional list of cities developed by DHS 
based on 2004 population data:37   
 
Albany, New York  Albuquerque, New Mexico Anaheim, California* 
Anchorage, Alaska  Arlington, Texas*  Atlanta, Georgia* 
Aurora, Colorado  Austin, Texas   Baltimore, Maryland*  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Boston, Massachusetts* Buffalo, New York* 
Charlotte, North Carolina* Chicago, Illinois*  Cincinnati, Ohio* 
Cleveland, Ohio*  Colorado Springs, Colorado Columbus, Ohio* 
Corpus Christi, Texas  Dallas, Texas*  Denver, Colorado* 
Detroit, Michigan*  El Paso, Texas   Fort Worth, Texas* 
Fresno, California  Honolulu, Hawaii*  Houston, Texas* 
Indianapolis, Indiana* Jacksonville, Florida*  Jersey City, New Jersey* 
Kansas City, Kansas*  Las Vegas, Nevada*  Lexington, Kentucky 
Lincoln, Nebraska  Long Beach, California* Los Angeles, California* 
Louisville, Kentucky* Memphis, Tennessee  Mesa, Arizona 
Miami, Florida*  Milwaukee, Wisconsin* Minneapolis, Minnesota*  
Nashville, Tennessee  New Haven, Connecticut New Orleans, Louisiana* 
New York, New York* Newark, New Jersey*  Oakland, California* 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma* Omaha, Nebraska*  Orlando, Florida 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania* Phoenix, Arizona*  Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania* 
Portland, Oregon*  Raleigh, North Carolina Richmond, Virginia 
Riverside, California  Sacramento, California* San Antonio, Texas* 
San Diego, California* San Francisco, California* San Jose, California* 
Santa Ana, California* Seattle, Washington*  St. Louis, Missouri* 
St. Paul, Minnesota  St. Petersburg, Florida Tampa, Florida* 
Toledo, Ohio*   Tuscon, Arizona  Tulsa, Oklahoma 
Virginia Beach, Virginia Washington D.C., NCR* Wichita, Kansas 
* Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) cities in 2005. 
                                                 
37 Department of Homeland Security, “Preparedness Directorate Information Bulletin No. 197, 
National Plan Review,” November 23, 2005.  
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This research was based on responses from the emergency management directors 
in the largest 75 cities in the United States (2005 UASI cities) under the assumption that 
these locales would be the most plausible targets of a radiological/nuclear terrorist attack. 
Although the intent was for the emergency management directors to complete the 
survey, allowances were made, particularly in large departments, to have other 
emergency management managers complete the survey if the director was unable (or 
unwilling) to do it (See Chapter IV, Table 1, for data on respondents by position). 
B. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND TESTING 
The survey instrument for the research was a questionnaire designed specifically 
for the local emergency management director.  The questionnaire’s format was modeled 
after suggestions given by Berdie and Anderson.38  By using a questionnaire in program 
evaluation and desires, the researcher remains separated and isolated from the opinions 
expressed by the respondent.  The questionnaire also followed the design guidelines for 
web-based surveys developed by Dillman which provide the most current 
recommendations on successfully designing, administering, and managing a web-based 
survey.39 
A commercial survey product, Zoomerang, was used to administer the web-based 
surveys to the target audience.  However, before administering the survey via Zoomerang 
several quality control steps were taken.  First, a basic list of questions was developed by 
this researcher and forwarded to officials at both the DOE National Nuclear Security 
Administration in Nevada, and the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate in 
Washington D.C. for their comments and suggestions.  Since both DOE and DHS will be 
consumers of the information gathered by this questionnaire and thesis project, their 
respective input was critical to ensuring the questions asked would elicit data they would 
find useful. 
                                                 
38 Douglas Berdie and John Anderson, “Questionnaires: Design and Use,” (Metuchen NJ: Scarecrow 
Press, 1974). 47. 
39 Don Dillman, “Mail and Internet Surveys – The Tailored Design Method,” (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 2000). 
23 
Following DOE and DHS S&T input, a draft questionnaire was developed.  After 
the questionnaire was designed and readied for survey implementation, an evaluative pre-
test was conducted involving three professionals from the Seattle-area emergency 
management community to test for weaknesses in the survey design.  Upon receiving the 
results of this pre-test, the questionnaire was revised and uploaded to the Zoomerang 
web-site for final formatting.  One day before delivering the Zoomerang questionnaire, a 
sensitizing email message was sent to all prospective respondents alerting them that the 
Zoomerang questionnaire would be forthcoming and underscoring the importance of this 
survey to the country’s RDD/IND preparedness efforts.  
C. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION 
Upon final revisions, the questionnaire was initially delivered via Zoomerang on 
April 9, 2006, to the identified respondents – the local emergency management directors 
of the top-75 communities in the United States (the survey was preceded by an 
introductory email to all respondents alerting them of the imminent arrival of the survey).  
Due to a lower than expected response rate (about 17 percent), a second pre-survey email 
was delivered to all non-respondents, followed a day later by the actual Zoomerang 
survey which was delivered on April 24, 2006.  After this second delivery of the 
Zoomerang survey the overall response rate increased to 30 percent.  In the hopes of 
improving the response rate further, a third and final email was sent to all non-
respondents this time with a web-link taking the respondent directly to the questionnaire.  
The results of this final solicitation, delivered on May 1, 2006, yielded an overall 
response rate of 40 percent.  
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the data gleaned from the completed surveys involved simple 
statistical methods to include percentage of responses per category, the mean, the median, 
and the mode.  Some basic analysis depicting the variance (level of consensus) was used, 
but no advanced statistical methods like one/two-way analysis of variance or multiple 
regression analysis was utilized. 
24 
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IV. SURVEY RESULTS 
This chapter provides descriptive statistics based on the survey data.  The first 
section presents an overview of the characteristics of the survey respondents including 
professional titles, years of experience, and the populations of the communities they 
serve.  The next part of the chapter assesses the current state of knowledge of local 
emergency management directors concerning various elements of large-scale (RDD/IND) 
radiological response operations.  The third section provides an overview of respondents’ 
information needs/desires on various aspects of managing a RDD/IND response 
operation.  The relationship of plans and training to radiological response information 
needs is then explored in the fourth section of this chapter.  Following this, relevant 
relationships between select variables are analyzed.  Finally, a summary of the major 
findings of this research is provided in Chapter V. 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS 
In order to understand the genesis of the data analyzed in this research and to 
place it into context, information is first provided on the demographic and professional 
characteristics of the respondents. 
1. Respondents’ Professional Position 
Of the original target audience of the emergency management directors of the 
largest-75 communities in the United States, a total of thirty (N=30) completed the 
questionnaire fully; of those, 70 percent were at the director level and an additional 23 
percent were somewhere in the management chain of their respective organizations (see 
Table 1).  Throughout this chapter the terms “emergency management directors” and 









Respondents’ Position Held Within the Emergency Management Organization 
















Director of Emergency 
Management 
 
    70% 
Deputy Director and/or 
Management 
 
    23% 
Staff 
 
    7% 
Table 1: Respondents’ Position Held Within the Emergency Management 
Organization 
2. Populations of Communities Served by Respondents 
Of those responding to the questionnaire over 73 percent were from communities 
with a population greater than a half-million residents; and 97 percent were from 
communities with populations exceeding 250,000 (see Table 2).  This, of course, is to be 
expected, since survey instruments were delivered to only the largest 75 communities, by 
population, in the United States.  
To ensure that prospective respondents felt uninhibited to answer the survey 
questions honestly (without retribution from their elected leaders, staff, or the media) 
survey recipients were made aware that only total, aggregate information for this research 
would be compiled, analyzed, and made public.  Therefore, information on exactly which 
of the targeted communities completed the survey instrument and individual community 





























Greater than 1 Million 
 
    30% 
Between 500,000 to 1 Million 
 
    43% 
Between 250,000 to 500,000 
 
    23% 
Under 250,000 
 
    3% 
Table 2: Population of the Communities Served by the Respondents  
3. Respondents’ Experience as Emergency Managers 
As Table 3 highlights, the respondents had a considerable amount of professional 
experience with 60 percent having greater than ten years professional emergency 
management experience while only one-fifth of the respondents had fewer than five years 
direct experience in the emergency management field. 
 

















Over 20 Years Experience 
 
    23% 
10 to 19 Years of Experience 
 
    37% 
5 to 9 Years of Experience 
 
    23% 
Less than 5 Years 
Experience 
 
    17% 
Table 3: Respondents’ Years of Professional Emergency Management Experience 
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4. Respondents’ Concern of an IND or RDD Attack 
Finally, since this research endeavored to ascertain what information emergency 
management directors need from federal technical experts on IND and RDD response 
operations, it seemed appropriate to first understand if emergency managers believe the 
IND/RDD threat is serious enough (to them) to warrant their receptivity to information 
on the topic from federal officials.  As Table 4 illustrates, emergency management 
directors, as a group, are slightly more concerned that an attack by a terrorist group using 
an RDD may occur than an attack using an IND.  Not only does this confirm that 
emergency managers are indeed concerned that an RDD/IND attack may occur within 
their jurisdiction, it also indicates that the respondents possess at least a rudimentary 
understanding of the differentiation between an IND and an RDD, since they ranked their 
concern of an IND attack lower than the probability of an RDD attack; this is consistent 
with most experts’ warnings that an IND attack would be, for technical reasons, 
significantly less probable than an RDD attack.40 
 
 
Local Emergency Managers’ Concern that a Nuclear or Radiological Terrorist 























Concerned that a 
Radiological Dispersal 
Device (RDD) Attack 
May Occur 
 
    3.37 
Concerned that an 




    2.37 
Table 4: Local Emergency Managers’ Concern that a Nuclear or Radiological 
Terrorist Attack May Occur in Their Community 
 
 
                                                 
40 Lugar, “The Lugar Survey.” 22. 
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B. KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT 
One of the objectives of this research was to establish a baseline understanding of 
the knowledge possessed by emergency managers in America’s largest cities concerning 
the conduct of large-scale radiological response operations following an RDD or IND 
terrorist attack.   
1. General versus Technical Knowledge on RDD and IND Response 
Operations 
If the federal government does decide to develop an information/educational 
campaign on RDD/IND response operations geared towards emergency managers, it is 
first necessary to understand which broad category of RDD/IND response operations that 
emergency management directors feel is most relevant to them.  As Table 5 shows, 
respondents believe that possessing information on the “big picture” elements of an 
RDD/IND response is more important than “technical” proficiency in various discrete 
elements of a radiological response.  This finding is in keeping with the emergency 
manager’s role as an incident coordinator as opposed to a field-level responder.  It also 
underscores the disconnect between the current training courses offered by the federal 
government on radiological response operations which are overwhelmingly technical in  
nature and the desire of emergency managers for more generalist information (the 
technical orientation of the federal government’s radiological response training courses is 
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Should Possess Strong 
Technical Knowledge of Rad 
Response Operations 
     3.82 
Emergency Managers 
Should Possess Strong 
Knowledge of the “Big 
Picture” of Rad Response 
Operations 
     4.57 
Table 5: Local Emergency Managers’ Assessment of the Importance of General 
and Technical Knowledge of Radiological Response Operations 
 
2. Knowledge of Radiological Response Operations versus other 
Hazards 
Emergency managers are charged with preparing for and responding to a variety 
of technological and natural hazard events including hazardous materials spills, 
hurricanes and windstorms, flooding, wildfires, major urban fires, domestic disturbances, 
earthquakes, civil unrest, power outages, anthropogenic and natural disease outbreaks, 
and, potentially, RDD and IND terrorist attacks in their communities.  Of all these 
hazards/disaster events, the respondents rated “nuclear/radiological terrorism” and 
“earthquakes and tsunamis” as the disasters of which they posses the least amount of 
knowledge (Table 6).  Interestingly, emergency management directors feel more 
comfortable in dealing with a “bioterrorism and pandemic disease” crisis than in 
responding to a large-scale radiological event.  Perhaps the learning curve on 
bioterrorism response has been aided recently by the specter of human-to-human avian 
flu transmission.  Regardless, it is striking that emergency managers believe they know 
more about preparing for and responding to bioterrorism (largely a public health 
endeavor) than they do about managing a large-scale radiological response which is 
predominately an emergency management responsibility.  
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Self-Assessed Knowledge and Expertise as an Emergency Manager in 



























    4.43 
Hurricanes, Tornadoes, and 
Windstorms 
 
    4.33 
Coastal and Rivering 
Flooding 
 
    4.07 
Explosive Bombings 
 
    3.87 
Wildfires 
 
    3.87 
Domestic Disturbances and 
Riots 
 
    3.83 
Bioterrorism and Pandemic 
Disease 
 
    3.83 
Nuclear and/or Radiological 
Terrorism 
 
    3.39 
Earthquakes and Tsunamis 
 
    3.38 
Table 6: Self-Assessed Knowledge and Expertise as an Emergency Manager in 
Preparing For and Responding To a Variety of Hazards 
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3. Knowledge of Various Components of a Large-Scale Radiological 
Response 
An RDD or IND response is highly complicated involving many discreet 
components.  Table 7 highlights respondents’ self-assessed knowledge of these various 
elements of an RDD/IND response.  In only one of fifteen categories, “developing public 
information messages” did respondents rate themselves, overall, as possessing expert 
knowledge.  This can likely be attributed to the all-hazards nature of delivering post-
emergency messages to the public; a fundamental duty of the emergency manager 
regardless of the type of disaster. 
However, despite the integral part that federal radiological response teams like the 
FRMAC, NARAC, RAP, and RERT41 would play in any RDD/IND response, emergency 
managers’ knowledge of the “types and organization of federal radiological response 
teams” rated second to last in the list of 15 categories presented in Table 7.  This is 
disconcerting given that close coordination between the FRMAC and the other federal 
response teams and the local Emergency Operations Center (i.e., the emergency 
management director) would likely be the most critical on-the-ground relationship during 
what would be a highly complicated and chaotic response following an RDD/IND attack. 
Rated last was “issuing agricultural advisories”.  Since the respondents all served 
in large cities, it may seem that the issuance of agricultural advisories or the coordination 
of embargoes on contaminated food crops would not directly affect the urban emergency 
manager.  However, many city and suburban residents have vegetable gardens while 
some may even pasture horses or other animals.  Given this, even the urban emergency 
manager should be prepared to develop public information messages concerning the 
ingestion of home-grown produce or animal feed following an RDD or IND attack. 
 
                                                 
41 The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is the Department of 
Energy’s (DOE) primary response team element to assess radiological contamination following an 
RDD/IND attack.  The National Atmospheric Release and Advisory Center (NARAC) is a DOE asset 
located at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory that develops plume predictive models used by the FRMAC and 
others in a radiological response.  The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) is the initial (smaller) DOE 
survey team that would precede the full FRMAC.  The Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT) is 
a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency asset and would assist the FRMAC in a response. 
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Emergency Managers’ Self-Described Knowledge of Various Elements of 



























    4.10 
First Responder Safety 
 
    3.93 
Decontamination Operations 
 




    3.87 
The Overall “Big-Picture” 
Steps in a Large-Scale Rad 
Response 
 
    3.77 
Basic Radiation Terms and 
Measurements 
 
    3.57 
Health and Biological Effects 
of Radiation 
 
    3.57 
Radiological Survey and 
Monitoring Operations 
 
    3.53 
Fear Management 
 
    3.50 
Various Types of Dosimeters 
and Survey Meters 
 
    3.50 
Medical Treatment of 
Contaminated Victims 
 
    3.43 
Victim Reception Center 
Operations 
 
    3.43 
Plume Predictive Modeling 
 
    3.23 
The Types and Organization 
of Federal Rad Response 
Teams 
 




    2.67 
Table 7: Emergency Managers’ Self-Described Knowledge of Various Elements of 
Large-Scale (RDD or IND) Radiological Response Operations 
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C. INFORMATION NEEDS 
Understanding the information and training needs of local emergency managers 
on the conduct of large-scale radiological response operations was one focus of this 
research; the results of which are summarized in this section. 
1. Factors Affecting Attendance at Radiological Training Courses 
Presently, there are a host of training courses, most of a technical nature, on 
radiological response operations.  While survey respondents attend some of these courses 
(Table 8), most cited “not enough time to attend” and “too far away” as the predominant 
factors limiting their more frequent attendance at these courses (Table 9).  This suggests 
that if the federal government wants local emergency managers to attend training courses 
on radiological response operations, it might prove beneficial to field-deploy shorter-
length courses to local communities instead of hosting the traditional week-long training 
courses at a central site within the United States.  This is consistent with the information 
shown in Table 13. 
 
Local Emergency Managers’ Attendance at Federally-sponsored Radiological 

























Director’s attendance at 
these courses 
     2.87 
Emergency Management 
staff’s attendance at these 
courses 
     3.00 
Table 8: Local Emergency Managers’ Attendance at Federally-sponsored 









Factors Limiting Emergency Managers’ Attendance at Radiological Response 
























Not Enough Time to Attend 
 
    3.77 
Too Far Away 
 
    3.10 
Too Costly to Attend 
 
    3.06 
Too Technical in Nature 
 
    2.76 




    2.42 
Not Technical Enough 
 
    2.16 
Table 9: Factors Limiting Emergency Managers’ Attendance at Radiological 
Response Training Courses and Workshops 
 
2. Information Needs on Radiological Response Operations and Their 
Relative Importance to the Emergency Manager 
The most salient portion of this research attempted to ascertain the type(s) of 
information on large-scale radiological response operations that local emergency 
management directors wish to receive from the federal government.  Consistent with their 
role as a crisis coordinator/manager, the primary answer to this question (see Table 10) is 
“the overall big-picture steps in a large-scale radiological response.”  In other words, 
emergency management directors do not necessarily want or need to know the technical 
details of any one radiological response discipline, but rather believe they need to 
understand how these discrete disciplines fit together in order to more effectively manage 
the overall incident. 
36 
Emergency management directors are also desirous of information on protective 
action decision-making.  Again, this is consistent with their responsibilities.  Following 
an RDD/IND attack, it is the local emergency manager director who will need to quickly 
determine what citizens in which area should shelter-in-place and which ones should 
evacuate.  This determination is the single most important decision to save lives in the 
immediate aftermath of a nuclear/radiological terror attack,42 and emergency 
management directors are obviously aware of this given the high score they attributed to 
this category. 
Third on the list of categories of RDD/IND response operations that emergency 
management directors wanted to receive more information on is “developing public 
information messages.”  This is interesting, because in a previous question, emergency 
management directors rated “developing public information messages” as that portion of 
an RDD/IND response that they had the most knowledge of.  Regardless, the 
respondents, by ranking public message development so high on their list of information 
needs, are highlighting the criticality of giving clear, concise messages to the public 
following an RDD/IND attack not only to save lives, but also to limit panic and fear (note 
that information on “fear management”, closely related to public messaging, is fourth on 
the list of information needs). 
Finally, it should be noted that of the 15 radiological emergency response steps or 
categories listed, respondents rated nine categories at 4.0 or greater on a 5.0 point scale.  
Meaning that emergency managers believe that it is “extremely important” for the federal 
government to provide information to them on the great majority of radiological response 









                                                 
42 Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios. February, 2006. 1-5. 
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Importance/Priority for Emergency Management Directors and Staff to Receive 
Information or Training from the Federal Government on Various Elements of 
























The Overall “Big Picture” 
Steps in a Large-Scale Rad 
Response 
 








    4.43 
Fear Management 
 
    4.33 
First Responder Safety 
 
    4.27 
Victim Reception Center 
Operations 
 
    4.20 
The Types and Organization 
of Federal Rad Response 
Teams 
 
    4.13 
Health and Biological Effects 
of Radiation 
 
    4.07 
Basic Radiological Terms 
and Measurements 
 
    4.00 
Decontamination Operations 
 
    3.93 
Plume Predictive Modeling 
 
    3.90 
Medical Treatment of 
Contaminated Victims 
 
    3.80 
Radiological Survey and 
Monitoring Operations 
 
    3.80 
Various Types of Dosimeters 
and Survey Meters 
 
    3.70 
Issuing Agricultural 
Advisories 
     3.63 
Table 10: Importance/Priority for Emergency Management Directors and Staff to 
Receive Information or Training from the Federal Government on Various Elements of 
Large-Scale (RDD or IND) Radiological Response Operations 
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3. Preferences for the Delivery of Radiological Response Information  
After analyzing the kinds of information on RDD/IND response operations that 
emergency management directors in America’s largest communities wish to receive, the 
follow-on question is: in what form or format do they wish to receive this information?  
Table 11 summarizes the results of this question showing that the strongest preference is 
for “Brief Guidebooks” followed by “local table-top exercises” and then “Full-day 
briefings”.   
The desire for information on RDD/IND response operations to be transmitted via 
“brief guidebooks” indicates that emergency managers want a concise, readily 
understandable synopsis of the topic as contrasted to the less-preferred “comprehensive 
publication”.  Emergency managers also prefer that information on RDD/IND response 
operations be drilled utilizing local table-top exercises as opposed to full-week training 


























Local Emergency Management Directors’ Preferred Form to Receive 
Information from the Federal Government on Large-Scale (RDD/IND) 


























    4.23 
Local Table-Top Exercises 
 
    4.00 
Full-Day Briefings 
 
    3.86 
Flyers or Pamphlets 
 
    3.63 
Comprehensive Publications 
 
    3.56 
Half-Day Briefings 
 
    3.50 
Full-Week Training Courses 
Held Locally 
 












    2.23 
Full-Week Training Courses 
Held at a Central U.S. Site 
 
    2.13 
Table 11: Local Emergency Management Directors’ Preferred Form to Receive 

















4. Rating of Federal Government Efforts to Date in Providing 
Radiological Disaster Preparedness Assistance 
To gauge the emergency management communities’ level of satisfaction with the 
federal government’s efforts in providing them with information on large-scale 
radiological response operations, respondents were asked to rate the federal government’s 
success in several categories (see Table 12).  In sum, local emergency management 
officials rated, in every category, the federal government’s efforts in this regard as being 
below an “adequate effort”. 
 
Local Emergency Managers’ Rating of Federal Government’s Efforts in 


























    2.33 
Technical Assistance with 
Plans 
 
    2.26 
Technical Assistance with 
Exercises 
 
    2.26 
Periodic Briefings and 
Presentations 
 
    2.20 
Periodic Meetings with 
Federal Officials 
 
    2.16 
Overall Rating43 
 
    2.36 
Table 12: Local Emergency Managers’ Rating of Federal Government’s Efforts in 
Providing Information on Large-Scale (RDD or IND) Radiological Response Operations 
 
                                                 
43 This question was asked separately which may explain why the mean of 2.36 is higher than the 
combined means of the five categories which were being judged. 
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D.  RELATIONSHIP TO PLANS AND TRAINING 
One of the objectives of this research was to gauge the status of communities’ 
radiological response plans and the frequency that these communities participate in 
radiological response exercises/drills and the relationship of these plans and exercises on 
the perceived needs of emergency management directors for information on large-scale 
radiological response operations. 
1. Status of Local Radiological Response Plans 
One of the findings of this research is that almost one-fourth of the communities 
responding to this survey have neither a stand-alone radiological emergency response 
plan or a radiological response annex to their Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) (see 
Table 13).  While having a radiological response plan and/or procedures may not be 
critical for smaller communities, the communities surveyed for this research are the 
largest metropolitan areas in the United States, and hence, the likeliest targets for an 
RDD/IND terrorist attack.44 
 
 
Status of Communities’ Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) 
















Community has an EOP 
 
    100% 
Community has either: A 
Stand-Alone Rad Response 
Plan, or a Rad Response 
Annex to the EOP 
 
    77% 
Table 13: Status of Communities’ Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) 
 
 
                                                 
44 The very establishment of the UASI grant program which provides additional homeland security 
grant funds solely for America’s largest communities above and beyond funds provided to states as part of 
the State Homeland Security Grant Program suggests that Congress views big cities as particularly 




2. Status of Participation in Radiological Response Drills or Exercises 
Another somewhat distressing finding, highlighted in Table 14, is that over two-
thirds of the emergency managers responding to this research have not participated in a 
radiological response drill or exercise in the past five years.  Again, given that over two-
thirds of the respondents lead the emergency preparedness and response activities for 
communities with over half-a-million residents, this datum is disconcerting. 
 
Respondents That Have Participated in a Large-Scale (RDD/IND) Radiological 
Response Drill or Exercise Within the Last Five Years 
















Yes, Have Participated in a 
Rad Drill or Exercise in Past 
Five Years 
 
    33% 
No, Have Not Participated in 
a Rad Drill or Exercise in the 
Past Five Years 
 
    67% 
Table 14: Respondents That Have Participated in a Large-Scale (RDD/IND) 
Radiological Response Drill or Exercise Within the Last Five Years 
3. Participation in Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness Exercises 
Finally, the majority of communities surrounding fixed commercial nuclear 
facilities participate in periodic drills and exercises under the Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness (REP) Program.45  The REP Program requires the development of 
sophisticated radiological response plans and procedures at the local level to prepare 
communities surrounding the plant to respond to a radiological emergency.  Table 15 
shows that 30 percent of the respondents to this survey participate in REP Exercises; 70 
                                                 
45 Managed formerly by FEMA and now the DHS Preparedness Directorate, communities within 10-
miles of a commercial nuclear power plant participate in biannual “plume” exercises that evaluate the 
utility’s as well as local and state government’s response to a radioactive release at the facility to include 
dose assessment, protective action decision making, notification to the public, traffic and access control and 
several other response measures.  Communities located within 50-miles of a commercial nuclear power 
plant participate in “ingestion” exercises once every six years to test the community’s ability to issue 
agricultural advisories and embargo crops if warranted following a radiological release from the facility. 
See the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Criteria for 
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of 




percent do not.   Since REP communities are required to have a radiological response 
plan, this means that most of the communities that do not have a radiological response 
plan as previously highlighted in Table 13 are not REP communities; meaning they are 
not located near a commercial nuclear facility. 
Respondents That Participate in Commercial Nuclear Power Plant 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP) Exercises 
















Participate in REP Plume 
and Ingestion Exercises 
 
    27% 
Participate in REP Ingestion 
Exercises Only 
 
    7% 
Do Not Participate in REP 
Exercises 
 
    70% 
Table 15: Respondents That Participate in Commercial Nuclear Power Plant 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP) Exercises 
E. RELEVANT RELATIONSHIPS 
A number of variables were cross-tabulated to determine if there were any 
relevant relationships between various demographic variables (i.e., community size, years 
in the profession, etc.) and a host of selected questions from the research.  In sum, none 
of the demographics were systematically related to the dependent variables (i.e., the 
research questions).  For example, no correlation was witnessed between the size of the 
community and the need for information on a number of discrete radiological response 
tasks from Table 7.  The only (minor) correlation witnessed was discovered when 
analyzing respondent’s opinions on the federal government’s efforts on providing 
information on large-scale response operations with whether or not a community has a 
stand-alone radiological response plan or incident annex.  In this case, those reporting 
that they did not have a dedicated radiological response plan were more likely to have an 
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V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
One of the purposes of this research was to discern what Emergency Managers in 
America’s largest cities know about large-scale radiological response operations, and 
more importantly, what kinds of information could the federal government provide them 
on the subject to better prepare them and their respective cities for a response to a future 
RDD/IND terrorist attack.  The following are some of the major findings of this research: 
Finding 1: Emergency management directors are slightly more concerned that 
an RDD attack may occur in their city, and are somewhat less concerned 
that they may face the aftermath of an IND attack. 
Finding 2: Emergency management directors feel strongly that they should 
possess keen knowledge of the overall “big-picture” components or steps 
of a large-scale (RDD/IND) radiological response operation. 
Finding 3: Compared with other types of hazard incidents, emergency 
management directors, by their own admission, know little about the 
conduct of large-scale radiological response operations. 
Finding 4: Emergency management directors understand little of the 
organizational structure and mission of the various federal radiological 
response teams.  They also know little about issuing agricultural 
advisories or developing plume predictive models following an RDD/IND 
attack. 
Finding 5: Emergency management directors do not attend current 
radiological response training courses because they do not have enough 
time to attend, and because they are located too far away to make 
attendance practical. 
Finding 6: Emergency management directors’ most pressing desire is for the 
federal government to provide them with information on the overall “big-
picture” elements of responding to an RDD/IND attack.  Other high 
priority requests for information include: the process and procedures for 
making rapid protective action decisions, how to develop and disseminate 
public information messages, and fear management techniques. 
Finding 7: Emergency management directors would like to receive 
information on large-scale radiological response operations via: brief 
guidebook publications, locally-held table-top exercises, and full-day 
briefings from federal officials.  Conferences, conducted either locally or 
at the national level, are the least preferred method for receiving 
information. 
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Finding 8: Emergency management directors believe that the federal 
government’s efforts to date to inform them about large-scale radiological 
response operations have been less than adequate. 
Finding 9: Almost one-fourth of the emergency managers responding to this 
survey stated that their community has neither a stand-alone radiological 
emergency response plan nor a radiological response annex to their 
Emergency Operations Plan. 
Finding 10: Over two-thirds of the emergency managers responding to this 
research have not participated in a radiological response drill or exercise 
in the past five years. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTION 
This Chapter presents two distinct sets of recommendations for federal action, one 
strategic the other tactical, derived from the data compiled by this research.  First, in 
Section A, recommendations are offered on the creation and revitalization of several 
federal government bureaucratic organizations designed to provide a strategic national-
level framework for improving the country’s RDD/IND preparedness.  The second set of 
recommendations in Section B of this chapter explores a range of tactical, field-level 
planning, training, and exercise outreach products that the federal government should 
produce to help improve the emergency management community’s RDD/IND response 
capabilities.  Both sets of recommendations, if implemented, will improve RDD/IND 
preparedness at all levels of government and will enable local emergency managers to 
respond more effectively to the consequences of an RDD or IND weapons attack, if and 
when such an attack occurs, thereby saving lives, reducing fear, and limiting the direct 
and indirect economic loss caused by such an attack. 
A. CONSTRUCT A NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
RDD/IND PREPAREDNESS 
The Department of Homeland Security’s National Planning Scenarios report 
details the extraordinary physical devastation, loss of life, and economic loss caused by 
the detonation of an RDD or an IND in an American city.46  Despite these dire scenarios 
and the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism highlighted earlier in this research, the 
federal government has yet to develop an overarching framework or create a single, 
unified body or organization to collectively plan and prepare for the consequences of an 
RDD or IND attack.  Although difficult to prove empirically, one of the reasons that 
emergency managers rated the federal government’s efforts in providing information on 
RDD/IND preparedness so low (see Chapter IV, Table 12) is that there simply is not a 
federal office, agency, or organization dedicated to managing or coordinating the 
country’s RDD/IND preparedness efforts.  This section intends to remedy this problem 
                                                 
46 Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios. February 2006. 1-1 to 1-41 and 
11-1 to 11-9.  
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by proposing the creation of several offices and organizational constructs within the 
federal government to lead, manage, and coordinate a sophisticated national-level effort 
to prepare emergency managers and other homeland security officials at every level of 
government for the consequences of nuclear or radiological terrorism. 
1. Create a New Homeland Security Presidential Directive Establishing 
the Domestic Nuclear Preparedness Office 
a. Limitations of the Federal Radiological Preparedness 
Coordinating Committee 
Currently, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee 
(FRPCC) is the sole national-level coordinative body dealing with radiological 
emergency preparedness issues.  The Committee, which meets quarterly in Washington 
D.C., is comprised of subject-matter experts from seventeen federal agencies with roles 
to play in responding to radiological emergencies at licensed commercial nuclear power 
plants.47  The function of the FRPCC is “to assist FEMA in providing policy direction 
for the program of technical assistance to state and local governments in their 
radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities…this assistance activity is 
extended to licensees.48 
While the FRPCC has recently veered into the realm of RDD/IND issues 
with its document describing protective actions following an RDD/IND event,49 there is 
no doubt that the legislation forming the FRPCC found in 44 CFR Parts 351-353 intends 
the body to focus on both on- and off-site emergency planning issues for commercial 
nuclear power plant licensees and not on broader radiological emergencies like the 
consequences of nuclear war or terrorism.  In fact, as established by regulations, the 
                                                 
47 The term ‘licensee’ means “the utility which has applied for or has received a license from the NRC 
to operate a commercial nuclear power plant.”  See, U.S. Government Printing Office, Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), Title 44, Part 352.1. (Washington D.C.: 2005). 604. 
48 44 CFR, Part 352.22. 607. 
49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness Directorate, Federal Register Notice, Volume 
71, Number 1, Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear 
Device (IND) Incidents, January 3, 2006. From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access.  
(http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20061800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/05-24521.htm)  
(accessed September 27, 2006). 193. 
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nuclear power industry is required to fund the salaries of many of the representatives to 
the FRPCC to include the entire staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as 
well as the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program staff within FEMA.50  
While the goal of the FRPCC is to assist communities in preparing for 
possible atmospheric radiation releases caused by a nuclear power plant accident, it is 
important to note that most American cities (and likely targets of an RDD or IND attack) 
are not located within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a commercial 
nuclear power plant, and, therefore, are not subject to, and do not benefit from, the 
radiological emergency preparedness policy guidance developed by the FRPCC.51 
Thus, while the FRPCC has the expertise to serve as the central, national, 
policy and planning body for domestic nuclear and radiological terrorism preparedness 
and response, several factors inhibited its ability to function in this capacity.  First, there 
are legislative restraints.  The FRPCC was created by Congress expressly and solely to 
coordinate nuclear power plant radiological emergencies not emergencies caused by 
nuclear terrorism.  Second, as required by law, many of the FRPCC participants are 
funded by the nuclear power industry via their respective agencies creating the rational 
expectation by the nuclear power industry that the FRPCC exists to support the industry 
and not other governmental priorities.  Finally, FRPCC members meet only once a 
quarter and do not serve full-time on the committee, but rather have “day jobs”.  
Therefore, because of these legislative restraints, partial funding by the nuclear power 
industry, a lack of dedicated staff, and an infrequent meeting schedule, the FRPCC is ill-
suited to serve as the central policy and planning organization to guide America’s 
RDD/IND preparedness effort.  
                                                 
50 44 CFR, Part 353.4 requires that “FEMA services will be billed at 6-month intervals for all 
accumulated costs on a site-specific basis.  Each bill will identify the costs related to services for each 
nuclear power plant site.” 
51 The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is a 10-mile area surrounding a nuclear plant in which 
communities are mandated to develop radiological emergency plans and procedures as well as participate 
in a variety of evaluated radiological emergency response exercises. See NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. 
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b. HSPD-14 and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office as a Model 
In 2005, President Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD)-14 establishing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).  The mission 
of the DNDO is to combat the threat of smuggled radiological materials into the United 
States by combining the radiological detection efforts of DHS, DOE, DoD and other 
federal agencies.  Specifically, the Office focuses on radiological and nuclear detection 
measures to include information sharing and intelligence on possible threats, research and 
development of radiological detection equipment, and the training of security specialists 
and other end users in the use of this equipment.52 
Before the DNDO was established, the mission of radiological detection 
and countermeasures was under the purview of the Office of Science and Technology 
(S&T) within DHS.  In Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, the entire budget for the Office of Science 
and Technology was $173 million.  However, once HSPD-14 was signed and issued in 
April, 2005, and the DNDO was officially established, the budget for radiological 
detection services alone, now under the DNDO, increased to $315 million in FY2006 and 
swelled to over $535 million in FY2007.53  There are two lessons to be drawn from this: 
(1) Because an Executive Order was issued (in the form of HSPD-14), several disparate  
federal agencies were required to come together under the aegis of the DNDO to begin 
work on the mission and objectives clearly articulated in the HSPD; and, (2) The very 
fact of having a formal HSPD signed by the President appears to have provided Congress 
with a clear focal point to allocate an increasing amount of funds towards radiological 
detection that did not exist to the degree it did before HSPD-14 was issued. 
                                                 
52 Federation of American Scientists, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-14: Fact Sheet.  April 
15, 2005.  http://www.fas.org.irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-42fs.html. (accessed October 21, 2006). 
53 At the time of this research, the $535 million represented the White House budget for the DNDO 
and had yet to be approved by Congress.  See, Government Executive.com. “Lawmakers May Cut Nuclear 
Detection Office Funding”. August 3, 2006.  http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0806/080306gsn1.htm. 
(accessed October 21, 2006).  
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c. Role of the Domestic Nuclear Preparedness Office (DNPO) 
Using HSPD-14 and the establishment of the DNDO as a model, and 
recognizing the restraints on the FRPCC to fully address nuclear/radiological 
preparedness issues, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) should pursue the 
development of a new HSPD creating the establishment of a Domestic Nuclear 
Preparedness Office (DNPO) to be housed within DHS. 
Like the DNDO, the DNPO would be staffed full-time by representatives 
from several federal agencies and have a Senate-confirmed Senior Executive Service 
Director.  Its mission would be to coordinate efforts to address the gaps in local, state, 
and federal preparedness with respect to responding and recovering from a large-scale 
nuclear or radiological disaster in the United States resulting from an act of terrorism or 
an Act of War by a nation-state.  The promulgation of an HSPD focused solely on 
improving the country’s radiological preparedness and the creation of the new DNPO 
would enable the federal government to:  
• Provide federal agencies and departments, state and local communities, 
the Department of Defense, and critical infrastructure sectors with a single 
point of contact for all matters relating to nuclear and radiological 
preparedness policy, planning, training, exercise, and response procedures; 
• Create a unity of effort by bringing together in one office representatives 
from DHS S&T, FEMA, EPA, DOE, DoD, HHS, and other federal 
agencies involved in some aspect of radiological preparedness and 
response assistance to local and state governments in order to foster 
improved federal interagency coordination and collaboration;54 
• Leverage radiological preparedness funds by providing Congress with a 
single accountable office for the receipt, oversight, and disbursement of 
these funds; 
                                                 
54 Presently, several Federal agencies are undertaking various initiatives to prepare local communities 
to respond to an RDD/IND attack.  These include: the DHS Office of Grants and Training (OGT) 
Homeland Defense and Equipment Reuse (HDER) Program; the DHS OGT and USDOT Joint-Federal 
Radiological Emergency Training (JFRET) Initiative; and the DHS S&T Radiological Community 
Preparedness Resource (RadCPR) program, and the HHS Office of Public Health and Emergency 
Preparedness outreach efforts.  In addition, DHS, FEMA, and DOE each separately offer numerous 
radiological training courses at their respective education centers.  Finally, many Federal agencies 
participate in joint RDD/IND local planning efforts to include Army (active) National Guard WMD Civil 
Support Teams (CST), and EPA and Coast Guard Regional Response Teams (RRT). 
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• Allow the FRPCC to continue its mandated focus on commercial nuclear 
power plant emergencies, but utilize its knowledge and expertise as a 
conduit to build a much broader full-spectrum nuclear and radiological 
preparedness national institution; 
• Serve as a horizontal link to the DNDO to ensure that emergency 
management and homeland security officials are receiving information on 
appropriate radiological detection equipment; 
• Provide direction for the development of RDD/IND planning, training, 
and exercise technical assistance and outreach products as called for in 
Section B of this chapter; 
• Provide potential cost-savings by providing a single office to oversee the 
numerous contractors that provide radiological preparedness support 
services to a variety of federal agencies/departments; and, 
• Oversee a robust regional approach to radiological preparedness by 
providing guidance and direction to re-invigorated Regional Radiological 
Assistance Committees via FEMA’s Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism 
Preparedness Section (see Section A-2 below). 
Once established, the first goal of this joint-Agency DNPO should be to 
draw upon the expertise of all the agency representatives of the DNPO, state and local 
radiological disaster experts, nuclear energy sector representatives, and others to produce 
a National Strategy for Nuclear and Radiological Disaster Preparedness.  When 
complete, this Strategy would establish the overarching framework for the activities of 
the DNPO and provide Congress and the American people with a template by which to 
judge the outcomes produced by the DNPO over time.  
In sum, the DNPO would ensure the implementation of the provisions of 
the new HSPD on domestic radiological preparedness by providing the senior-level 
foundation of a joint, national-level, radiological and nuclear terrorism preparedness 
system for the country’s emergency management, homeland security, and first-responder 
communities.   
2. Establish a Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism Preparedness Section 
within FEMA Headquarters 
As explained in the previous section, like the FRPCC, the FEMA Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff are, by statute, charged with overseeing 
and implementing radiological preparedness programs for communities surrounding 
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commercial nuclear power plants.55  Because of this nuclear power plant focus, and due 
to a hectic REP planning, training, and exercise regimen, REP staff at both the FEMA 
headquarters level and at the FEMA Regional office level perform virtually no RDD/IND 
preparedness functions.56  This lack of any formal organization or staff within FEMA 
headquarters dedicated to planning and preparing for the consequences of radiological or 
nuclear terrorism is disconcerting given that two of the fifteen National Planning 
Scenarios that were created by DHS to drive local, state, and federal readiness programs 
are IND and RDD scenarios.57  
This noticeable lack of alignment by FEMA with its own parent agency’s 
preparedness goals would not be so conspicuous if FEMA did not already have distinct 
work units dedicated, in some form, to each of the specific hazards as outlined in the 
National Planning Scenarios.  For instance, FEMA has a National Earthquake Program 
with dedicated headquarters and field level staff (Scenario 9)58; a large floodplain 
management program with over 240 headquarters and regional staff (Scenario 10)59; the 
National Disaster Medical System dedicated to preparing for infectious disease outbreaks 
(Scenarios 2, 3, and 4);60 and, up until 2005, FEMA had a hazardous materials program, 
again, with dedicated headquarters and field-level staff that work closely with the 
Agency’s Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (Scenarios 6, 7, and 
                                                 
55 44 CFR, Part 350. 
56 In an email survey conducted by the author on October 17, 2006, the nine FEMA REP Program 
Managers (RRAC Chairs) were asked to respond either “no” or “yes” to the following question: “As a 
group is your REP staff or RRAC involved in any non-nuclear power-plant (ie, RDD/IND) radiological 
response planning, training, or exercises?”  Of the five responses received, three answered “no”; one 
answered “no”, but then explained how some members of their RRAC also participate in Regional 
Interagency Steering Committee (RISC) meetings where IND/RDD issues are discussed; and one answered 
“no”, but then wrote “EPA only”.  This confirms the author’s own experience as the former REP Program 
Manager and RRAC Chair in FEMA Region 10. 
57 DHS, National Planning Scenarios. See Chapters 1 and 11 on IND and RDD scenarios, respectively.  
58 The FEMA National Earthquake Program is currently comprised of 18 headquarters and regional 
staff. Chris Jonientz-Trisler (Earthquake Program Coordinator, FEMA Region 10) e-mail exchange with 
author, October 28, 2006.  
59 Approximately 240 Full-Time Employees work in the FEMA Floodplain Management and National 
Flood Insurance Program.  Carl Cook (Mitigation Division Director, FEMA Region 10), personal interview 
with the author, November 20, 2006. 
60 The National Disaster Medical System was transferred from HHS into DHS in 2003 and into FEMA 
in 2004; about 100 Full-Time Employees are assigned to work NDMS.  See, “What is the NDMS” at 
http://www.fema.gov/media/backgrounders/ndms_bg.shtm. (accessed October 22, 2006). 
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8).61  While virtually every hazard outlined in the National Planning Scenarios has (or 
had) an organization within FEMA dedicated to preparing the nation for its respective 
post-disaster consequences, there are two hazards/scenarios that remain organizationally 
unaddressed: radiological and nuclear terrorism. 
To address this hazards/scenario gap, FEMA should create a Nuclear/Radiological 
Preparedness Section to be located within the Preparedness Division at FEMA 
headquarters.  The mission of this Section would be to: 
• Serve as the conduit between the newly created Domestic Nuclear 
Preparedness Office (DNPO), and the Preparedness, Response, and 
Recovery Divisions of FEMA; 
• Prepare FEMA and other federal agency Emergency Support Functions 
(ESFs) staff to fulfill their IND/RDD response coordination role as 
outlined in the National Response Plan (NRP) Nuclear/Radiological 
Incident Annex by developing Regional Response Coordination Center 
(RRCC) and National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) training and 
exercise modules on managing the consequences of an RDD/IND attack; 
• Provide direction and guidance to the re-invigorated Regional 
Radiological Assistance Committees (RRACs) and the newly created 
Nuclear and Radiological Preparedness Officers (NRPOs) in each of the 
FEMA regions as outlined in the following section; 
• Work closely with the FEMA Emergency Management Institute in the 
development of RDD/IND response training courses for emergency 
management and homeland security officials; 
• Coordinate with other federal agencies and departments, directly and 
through the FRPCC, that are providing some kind of radiological 
preparedness technical assistance to state and local communities to 
include: the DHS S&T Directorate, DOE, EPA, HHS, and DoD; and, 
• Based on the priorities set by the DNPO, leverage the experience with 
community radiological disaster preparedness achieved over the past 25 
years by the FEMA REP Program by utilizing REP policies, planning, and 
exercise guidance documents to form a suite of new publications and 
outreach materials on RDD and IND disaster preparedness and response. 
                                                 
61 Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
Public Law 96-510, the EPA and FEMA entered into an interagency agreement each year where EPA 
would fund a hazardous material specialist position at each FEMA Regional office to perform a variety of 
hazardous materials coordination functions with local, state, and Federal governments.  Beginning in Fiscal 
Year 2007, EPA decided to no longer fund these positions.  See the FEMA, “FEMA/EPA Interagency 
Agreement Scope of Work for Fiscal Year 2005”. 
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Furthermore, this may be an optimal time to establish this Section due to the 
recent passage of the Post-Katrina Reform Act of 2006 which mandates the move of the 
homeland security grants program office, training, and exercise functions now located 
within the DHS Preparedness Directorate into its counterpart preparedness program 
offices within FEMA.62  This consolidation of the preponderance of DHS’s homeland 
security preparedness apparatus under one roof within FEMA could, if coupled with the 
creation of a Nuclear/Radiological Preparedness Section at FEMA, produce synergies 
that could greatly enhance local, state, and federal radiological preparedness and response 
coordination. 
For example, because the nation’s multi-billion dollar all-hazards preparedness 
grants will be the responsibility of FEMA to manage beginning in March 2007, FEMA 
officials will soon be in much closer contact with state and UASI emergency 
management and homeland security officials.  These relationships will enable FEMA 
grants staff to readily gauge state and local nuclear/radiological disaster preparedness 
assistance needs.  At the regional level, these needs could be easily transmitted to the 
RRAC Chairs and Nuclear and Radiological Preparedness Officers and then on to the 
Nuclear/Radiological Preparedness Section at FEMA headquarters where the appropriate 
technical assistance actions could be decided upon and taken.  Similar coordination 
improvements could also be realized between the new Nuclear/Radiological Preparedness 
Section and exercise program and training office officials which are also now 
consolidated within FEMA. 
In short, the creation of a modest-sized 7 to 12 member Nuclear/Radiological 
Preparedness Section at FEMA Headquarters staffed by appropriately trained and 
experienced health physicist and emergency management professionals could serve as an 
institutional bridge of sorts between the vision and goals set by the DNPO and the 
Agency’s enhanced regional role in assisting communities with RDD/IND preparedness 
efforts as discussed in the next section.  
                                                 
62 The Office of Grants and Training (OGT) within the Preparedness Directorate is to be transferred to 
FEMA effective March 31, 2007.  See P.L. 109-295 (HR 5441), the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act of 2006, new section 505 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
56 
3. Focus the Regional Radiological Assistance Committees on RDD/IND 
Preparedness Issues 
a. The Need for a Regional Approach 
Since the primary customers of the recommendations posited in Section B 
of this Chapter are local emergency management officials in communities scattered 
around the United States, providing radiological response planning, training, and exercise 
technical assistance to this audience will be difficult if managed solely from Washington 
D.C. via the DNPO or the FEMA Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism Preparedness Section.  
To be effective, it is imperative that some kind of regional, field-level approach be 
undertaken that fully integrates local, state, and federal nuclear/radiological disaster 
preparedness efforts. 
The concept of using a regional approach to improve our country’s 
terrorism preparedness level has recently been given renewed interest by DHS.  In fact, 
“Expanded Regional Collaboration” is one of the seven national priorities for our 
country’s homeland security strategy.63  While the regionalism expounded in the State 
and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy is focused on multi-city and county intra-
state regional approaches, the recently adopted Post-Katrina Reform Act of 2006 focuses 
on inter-state regional approaches by requiring FEMA to establish Regional Advisory 
Councils (RACs) within each FEMA region to: 
Advise the Regional Administrator (of FEMA Regional Offices) on 
emergency management issues specific to that region; and, advise the 
Regional Administrator of any weaknesses or deficiencies in 
preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation for any state, 
local, and tribal government within the region of which the Regional 
Advisory Council is aware.64  
Fortunately, the concept of regional collaboration is not new to the federal 
radiological response community in the United States.  Through the Regional 
Radiological Assistance Committees (RRACs) established a generation ago, the federal 
                                                 
63 Department of Homeland Security, State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy, Guidance on 
Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal. (Washington D.C. 2005). 8. 
64 Post-Katrina Reform Act, P.L. 109-295, new Homeland Security Act, Section 507(e)-(f).  
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government already has a multi-disciplined, multi-agency body to coordinate radiological 
emergency preparedness efforts.  The problem is, as currently exists, the RRACs in each 
FEMA region, like the FRPCC, are focused on preparing for radiological emergencies in 
communities surrounding nuclear power plants, and not terrorism-induced nuclear or 
radiological disasters in our largest cities.   
b. The RRAC mission 
In the aftermath of the Three-Mile Island nuclear power plant emergency 
in 1979, Congress created the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program to 
be overseen by Regional Radiological Assistance Committees (RRACs) in nine of the ten 
FEMA regional offices with commercial nuclear power plants in their respective regions.  
The purpose of the RRACs was (and is) to “assist state and local government officials in 
the development of their radiological emergency response plans, and (to) review plans 
and observe exercises to evaluate the adequacy of these plans and related 
preparedness.”65 
Each RRAC is currently chaired by a FEMA representative in each of the 
FEMA regional offices and is comprised of regional representatives from DOE, EPA, 
HHS, NRC, USDA, and USDOT.  In brief, the RRAC provides a ready-made, regional 
forum of federal radiological response subject matter expertise.  However, as previously 
noted, the RRACs expertise is focused almost exclusively on nuclear power plant 
emergencies, and the Committees do little if any joint-planning for RDD or IND 
terrorism-induced radiological emergencies.  This is not the fault of the respective 
RRACs.  Like the FRPCC, the regulations governing the RRACs make clear that 
Congress’s intent on establishing these bodies was to focus on commercial nuclear power 
plant emergencies.  This restriction, coupled with the fact that all FEMA Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff, to include the RRAC Chairs, are funded 
through fees collected by FEMA from the nuclear power industry, make the use of the  
 
 
                                                 
65 44 CFR, Part 350.6. 
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RRACs as a vehicle for assisting local communities’ efforts to prepare for 
nuclear/radiological terrorist events, problematic, at best.66  So, the questions posited are 
two-fold:  
1) How can the RRACs, a pre-existing, regionally-based, cadre of 
federal radiological preparedness and response technical experts, 
be utilized to assist cities and states with RDD and IND response 
planning without contravening federal regulations?; and, 
2) If the above question can be satisfactorily addressed, what are the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges posed by 
utilizing the RRACs to assist local communities, and how should 
the RRACs be integrated into the larger local/state regional 
homeland security framework? 
c. Expanding the RRAC Charter 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) working with the 
FRPCC should utilize the radiological emergency expertise of the RRACs by expanding 
the RRAC charter to focus these committees on nuclear and radiological terrorism 
preparedness issues in addition to their traditional nuclear power plant focus.  
Accomplishing this objective, however, will require two major concurrent actions: 
1) Legislative modifications – FEMA should modify the regulations 
governing the RRAC found in 44 CFR, Parts 350-353, to give the 
RRAC the latitude to address RDD and IND issues.  Specifically, 
language should be added that explicitly allows the RRACs to 
focus on the full spectrum of nuclear and radiological emergencies 
to include fixed nuclear facilities and radiological emergencies 
resulting from acts of terrorism and acts of war. 
2) Funding and Staffing Solutions – Changing the legislation to give 
the RRACs the authority to work on nuclear/radiological terrorism 
issues solves the legal dilemma, but not the financial one.  The fact 
that the nuclear power industry pays the salary, benefits, and travel 
expenses of the FEMA RRAC Chairs is a significant impediment 
to freeing the RRAC to pursue RDD/IND preparedness issues.  To 
solve this dilemma FEMA should dedicate annual discretionary 
operating funds for the following: 
• Create a Nuclear and Radiological Preparedness Officer 
(NRPO) Position at each FEMA Region – First, the FRPCC 
should advocate, and FEMA should create, a Nuclear and 
                                                 
66 44 CFR, Parts 353.4 and 353.5. 
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Radiological Preparedness Officer (NRPO) position within 
each FEMA Region.  The position description for this new 
position should include daily management and coordination 
of the RRAC to include meeting agenda development, 
RDD/IND workshop/training development, regional 
radiological exercise development and coordination, the 
dissemination and interpretation of federal radiological 
response policies and standards, and coordination with the 
Regional Interagency Steering Committees (RISC) on all 
matters relating to RDD/IND preparedness.  This position 
would not supplant the RRAC Chair, but would ideally 
serve as his/her assistant or operations officer, only with a 
focus on nuclear/radiological terrorism preparedness 
instead of fixed nuclear facilities.  
• Provide the RRAC Chairs and NRPOs with Discretionary 
Funds – Secondly, FEMA should provide each RRAC 
Chair and NRPO with a substantial travel and 
miscellaneous budget each year to fund training courses, 
workshops and exercises, as well as to fund the travel of 
local and state officials to these activities (e.g., paying the 
expenses of non-REP UASI communities to travel to REP 
communities to participate in exercises; see Section A-5 
below on the “Sister Cities” Initiative).  Bringing together 
emergency management and other officials from all levels 
of government across a multi-state geographical region can 
be costly.  An adequate discretionary budget would enable 
the respective RRAC Chairs to promote the development 
and integration of state, local, and federal radiological 
response planning and training at the regional level. 
While these recommendations would strengthen FEMA’s leadership of the 
RRAC, ensuring involvement from the other federal agencies represented on the RRAC 
would be greatly aided by the adoption of two previously mentioned recommendations.  
First, the promulgation of an HSPD on nuclear and radiological disaster preparedness 
would provide an obvious impetus to all the federal agencies currently serving on each of 
the RRACs to commit the necessary energy and resources to this new RDD/IND 
preparedness mission.  Secondly, the publication of a Nuclear and Radiological Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy for the United States (see Section A-1 of this chapter) that 
emphasized the need for the federal government to regionalize much of its RDD/IND 
preparedness efforts would also help ensure the commitment to the RRAC by member 
agencies.   
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d. Integrating the RRACs into the Larger Regional Framework 
While strengthening and re-focusing each of the RRACs to assist local 
emergency management and homeland security agencies with RDD/IND preparedness 
efforts would be a worthy goal in and of itself, to be truly complementary and value-
added, the RRACs should be folded into a broader, interagency, regional framework.  
Two options currently exist in this regard:  
• RRAC subcommittee of RISC – At the federal (FEMA) regional 
level, the Regional Interagency Steering Committees (RISCs) are 
the primary federal-to-state coordinative disaster preparedness 
bodies.  Specifically, the RISCs are responsible for multi-agency 
coordination under the National Response Plan (NRP) and are 
“comprised of representatives from each state in the region, and, 
where appropriate regional-level representatives from Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) primary and support agencies.  RISCs 
meet at least quarterly and provide an operational-level forum for 
regional planning, interagency information-sharing and 
coordination.”67  One concept to better integrate the RRACs into a 
larger regional framework would be to make the RRACs a formal 
subcommittee of the RISCs.  Such an arrangement already 
informally exists in a few FEMA regions.  For instance, in FEMA 
Region IV in Atlanta, members of the region’s RRAC regularly 
attend RISC meetings (although do not represent a formal 
subcommittee).68  Although such a structure may aid in 
information sharing, given the lack of local community 
representation on the RISC, using this body to advance the work of 
the RRACs may not be the optimal solution. 
• RRAC into RAC – Perhaps the better forum to truly regionalize and 
operationalize the RRACs would be to make them a permanent 
subcommittee of the soon-to-be-formed Regional Advisory 
Councils (RACs).  As previously stated, The Post-Katrina Reform 
Act calls for the establishment of “a joint local, tribal, state and 
federal RAC (within each FEMA region) to discuss issues 
pertinent to all phases of emergency management and homeland 
security.”69  Since FEMA Chairs both the RRACs and the new 
RACs, there appears to be a natural synergy between the two 
committees.  While it remains to be seen how these RACs will 
                                                 
67 Department of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan (Washington D.C.: December 
2004). 58. 
68 Conrad Burnside (RRAC Chair, FEMA Region 4), email exchange with author, October 17, 2006. 
69 Post-Katrina Reform Act, P.L. 109-295, new Homeland Security Act, Section 507(e)-(f). 
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ultimately be structured, the legislation creating them suggests that 
they might be an ideal forum through which the respective RRACs 
could gauge local desires regarding RDD and IND terrorism 
preparedness and response issues.  The RRACs therefore should 
serve as subcommittee to the respective RACs as soon as these 
bodies are formed. 
e. Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Challenges Analysis 
Figure 1 provides a Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Challenges 
(SWOC) Analysis for the proposed reinvigoration of the Regional Radiological 
Assistance Committees (RRACs) to focus on RDD/IND preparedness assistance to local 
communities.  The SWOC analysis is “a popular strategic planning tool (that) helps 
identify an organization’s key success factors” by analyzing opportunities and building 
upon strengths while recognizing the challenges and weaknesses inherent in the desired 
goal.70  While there are certainly weaknesses and threats to focusing the RRACs on 
RDD/IND preparedness issues, as Figure 1 shows, these shortcomings are outweighed by 
the strengths and opportunities created by this recommendation. 
 
                                                 
70 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to 




Figure 1.   SWOC Analysis: Refocusing the RRACs on RDD and IND Preparedness 
 Currently there is a lack of a dedicated 
funding source to conduct RRAC 
meetings or travel to local communities 
to provide technical assistance. 
 
“Buy-in” from the Federal agencies 
comprising the RRAC asked to expand 
their RRAC duties to address 
nuclear/radiological terrorism is not pre-
ordained.  
 
Modifying Federal legislation to enable 
the RRAC to address 
nuclear/radiological terrorism issues is a 
lengthy process involving many layers of 
approval. 
Local emergency managers have expressed a need for 
Federal technical assistance with radiological 
response planning, training, and exercises. 
 
Federal agencies/departments which have a 
significant role in an RDD/IND response will have a 
regular forum to interact with their state and local 
counterparts and other officials with responsibilities in 
the aftermath of an RDD/IND attack. 
 
Integration of the RRACs into the soon-to-be created 
local, state, and Federal Regional Advisory Councils 
(RACs) within each FEMA Regional office would 
meet the DHS strategic priority of “expanded regional 
collaboration.” 
The creation of a new Nuclear and 
Radiological Preparedness Officer position 
within each FEMA Region will require the 
development of a business case and need to 
be vetted through several channels before 
funding of these positions could be 
approved. 
 
Other DHS entities and other Federal 
agencies with a role to play in preparing 
communities for a radiological emergency 
may oppose FEMA leadership of the 
radiological/nuclear terrorism preparedness 
mission via the RRAC. (However, this 
should be tempered since most of these 




RRAC members are subject matter experts in their 
respective areas of discipline and could provide a 
wealth of information to local and state officials. 
 
RRAC members frequently participate in off-site 
nuclear power plant exercises which involve 
response components very similar to an RDD/IND 
response. 
 
RRAC members review and comment on the 
radiological response plans and procedures of 
nuclear power plant off-site communities; plans 
which are very similar to RDD/IND response plans. 
 
RRAC members have numerous contacts within 
their respective radiological response disciplines 
which could be used to leverage additional support 
to local emergency managers. 
 
The RRAC Chairs are kept abreast of the latest 
Federal radiological policy discussions and decisions 
through interaction with the FRPCC.  
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f. Benchmarking the Regional Response Teams 
Utilizing a federal regional preparedness forum like the RRACs to 
coordinate local, state, and federal emergency response planning is not a new concept.  
The United States Coast Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Regional Response Teams (RRTs) have been effectively integrating local, state, 
federal, and private partners together to plan and prepare for oil spills and hazardous 
materials releases for two decades.   
Under the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the Coast Guard and EPA 
have established 13 RRTs in the United States each representing a particular geographic 
region.  With input from state officials, local cities and counties, private sector interests, 
and federal agencies, each RRT develops a Regional Contingency Plan to ensure all 
potential responders within an established geographic area are integrated and clearly 
understand their respective roles in a hazardous materials disaster response.  The RRTs, 
which meet quarterly, provide a transparent forum for federal, state, local and private 
entities to collectively plan, train, and exercise their hazardous materials disaster 
responsibilities.71  
Using the RRTs as a model, the RRACs should expand their meeting 
participant base beyond the current federal agency focus to encompass a broad array of 
state and local health, emergency management, and first responder officials.  This 
expansion of the RRAC meeting base could be facilitated by the inclusion of the RRAC 
as a subcommittee of the soon-to-be-established RACs as previously recommended.  
Once assembled, this larger RRAC could itself form various subcommittees, like the 
RRTs, that focus on particular training, planning, or exercise shortcomings endemic to 
that respective region.  
                                                 
71 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Emergency Response Program, Regional Response Teams, 
http://www./epa.gov/superfund/programs/er/nrs/nrsrrt.htm. (accessed November 10, 2006). 
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4. Develop a Model Unified Command Incident Management Structure 
for an RDD/IND Response 
a. RDD/IND Response Complexities 
A large-scale radiological emergency response involving an RDD or IND 
detonation will be highly complicated.  The potential for mass-casualties and mass-panic 
notwithstanding, an RDD/IND response will involve thousands of responders from all 
levels of government that will have to work together in a level of interaction far beyond a 
conventional natural disaster response.  This is so because not only will the “normal” 
federal search and rescue, incident management teams, and Emergency Support 
Functions (ESFs) be involved in the response, but hundreds and even thousands of 
additional technicians will be employed by the DOE FRMAC and DoD to assess 
atmospheric contamination levels and monitor people and the built-environment.  
Integrating the FRMAC into an Incident of National Significance/Stafford Act Joint Field 
Office (JFO)-type response and discerning which responsibilities belong to the FRMAC 
and which to the JFO is a significant concern during an RDD/IND response; a concern 
that will reverberate across all levels of government since FRMAC personnel will be 
working side-by-side with both local and state first responders for an extended period of 
time.72   
Given this close interaction between federal, state, and local responders 
during an RDD or IND incident, and the scale of an RDD or IND response, it becomes 
apparent that both radiological response plans and, moreover, incident command 
structures to manage a large-scale radiological response must be inextricably linked at 
every level of government.  One way to forge this linkage would be to develop a 
consistent, standardized, integrated, and mutually agreed-upon Unified Command (UC) 
incident management structure for an RDD/IND event before the event occurs.  
 
                                                 
72 One of the primary AAR comments from the EPA and State of Georgia “Southern Crossing” RDD 
exercise in August 2006 concerned the difficulty of integrating the FRMAC into both the Operations and 
Planning Section of the ICS structure.  See, United States Environmental Protection Agency Region 4, 
Southern Crossing Issues from the Incident Command Perspective. (Atlanta: September 2006). 
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b. Fulfilling a Documented Need 
Under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident 
Command System (ICS), a Unified Command (UC) is defined as: 
A structure that brings together the "Incident Commanders" of all major 
organizations involved in the incident in order to coordinate an effective 
response while at the same time carrying out their own jurisdictional 
responsibilities. The UC links the organizations responding to the incident 
and provides a forum for these entities to make consensus decisions. 
Under the UC, the various jurisdictions and/or agencies and non-
government responders may blend together throughout the operation to 
create an integrated response team.73 
The benefits of this integrated response team philosophy ensconced within 
the organizational construct of the Unified Command structure has been noted for some 
time.  In fact the need to utilize a UC structure to manage the consequences of an RDD or 
IND attack has been noted during a number of major recent exercises.  For example, the 
After Action Report (AAR) from the first TOPOFF Exercise in 2000 which was an RDD 
scenario for the National Capitol Region stated that “the federal government should adopt 
the widely used NIMS ICS/UC (Unified Command) system as the standard response 
management system at incident sites including WMD incidents.”74  Likewise the AAR 
following the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency’s “Vigilant Lion” RDD 
Exercise back in 1999 stated that “the concept of Unified Command must be further 
refined in an operational sense…to permit the smooth integration of efforts and command 
responsibility as called for by the dynamics of the incident.”75  Finally, although not an 
RDD-related issue, the 9/11 Commission considered the disaster response to the 
Pentagon attack a success do, in part, to an unified incident command system that was 
agreed-upon and in-place prior to the attacks.76  
                                                 
73 New Hampshire Homeland Security and Emergency Management. NIMS Frequently Asked 
Questions.  http://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/bem/Planning/planning_muni_nims_faq.html#FAQ20 
(accessed October 1, 2006). 
74 National Response Team. TOPOFF 2000 After Action Final Report (Washington D.C.: 2001). 5. 
75 Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. Vigilant Lion After Action Report, September 30, 
1999.  http://wearcam.org/decon/hospital_decon_facility_drill.htm (accessed September 28, 2006). 39. 
76 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. 
(Washington D.C.: 2004). 314. 
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Aside from several exercise AAR recommendations, two recently released 
federal agency documents clearly articulate the importance of utilizing a UC structure to 
manage the consequences of a RDD/IND attack.  The first, a recently published Federal 
Register Notice announcing the draft guidance on protective action guides for RDDs and 
INDs makes clear that DHS expects that a UC structure is to be used during an RDD or 
IND response.  It states: 
As federal response assets arrive on scene, they will be incorporated into 
the on-scene incident command established by State and local officials and 
then become part of the unified command structure.  In general, the 
primary agencies expected to be represented in the Unified Command for 
an RDD or IND response incident are the agencies with primary response 
authority and include DHS, FBI, DOE, EPA, and other Federal, State, and 
local government agencies, as appropriate. Other Federal agencies (e.g., 
NRC, OSHA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and DoD) will be requested 
to support the response in accordance with the NRP and NIMS.77 
The second, a U.S. National Response Team (NRT) report seeking ways 
to reconcile various federal government emergency response plans like the Terrorism 
Concept of Operations Plan and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan 
explicitly recommends that “the Unified Command (UC) should be adopted by the 
federal government as its ‘on-scene’ management structure, and a standard management 
structure at the regional and national levels established for all incidents.”78 
However, despite these numerous exercise AAR recommendations, NRT 
report recommendations, and DHS expectations regarding the need for the use of a UC 
incident management structure to manage the consequences of an RDD/IND disaster, 
neither DHS, FEMA, DOE, EPA or any other federal agency has produced a model or 
template RDD/IND UC structure.  One of the goals of this research, therefore, is to 
provide such a model. 
                                                 
77 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness Directorate, Federal Register Notice, Volume 
71, Number 1, Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear 
Device (IND) Incidents, January 3, 2006. From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access.  
(http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20061800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/05-24521.htm)  
(accessed September 27, 2006). 193. 
78 National Response Team, Reconciling Federal Emergency Response Plans – NRT Homeland 
Security Recommendations.  (Washington D.C.: January, 2003). v and 13. 
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Aside from meeting the aforementioned recommendations and 
expectations, the development of a model RDD/IND UC structure would have several 
tangible benefits: 
• First, since over two-thirds of the local emergency management 
agencies surveyed in this research have not participated in a large 
scale radiological response exercise within the past five years, a 
model UC structure for an RDD/IND event could, in some way, 
substitute for the lack of RDD/IND exercise participation by 
assisting these communities in at least understanding the command 
and control architecture of an RDD/IND response; 
• Second, since one-third of emergency management agencies do not 
have a stand-alone radiological response plan or annex to their 
EOP, a model UC structure produced by the federal government 
would help these communities understand their respective role in 
the multi-agency response picture, especially vis-à-vis the National 
Response Plan, thereby providing them with an important 
component and tool to craft their own plans; 
• Third, since understanding the “big-picture” of a large-scale 
radiological response and understanding the roles and relationships 
of federal radiological response teams were two of the most 
highly-rated categories of information sought by local emergency 
managers, a published model of a UC structure for an RDD/IND 
event would go a long way to meeting local emergency 
management director’s need to grasp the big-picture of an 
RDD/IND response; 
• Finally, the development of a UC template for a possible real-
world event like an RDD/IND attack would help those 
communities struggling to understand the relevancy of the Incident 
Command System portion of the National Incident Management 
System gain an appreciation of its real-world utility. 
c. Development and Implementation 
In order to start the process of developing a model RDD/IND disaster 
response UC structure, the author convened a meeting of DOE and EPA officials on 
August 30, 2006, to discuss the feasibility of creating such a structure to be utilized 
during the RDD-scenario TOPOFF-4 exercise to be held in Portland, Oregon, in October 
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2007.79  This meeting was followed-up with a larger federal workgroup meeting on 
November 29, 2006.80  The results of this meeting produced the model RDD/IND UC 
structure depicted in Figure 2. 
For purposes of the model depicted in Figure 2, it is assumed that the 
initial Incident Command for an RDD/IND event would likely be led by local senior first 
responder officials who immediately arrive on the scene.  Other non-local representatives 
like the FBI WMD Coordinator, DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team 
Leader, and State Health officers may arrive within a few hours of the incident, but 
would likely serve in an advisory role and not as part of the Incident Command (IC) 
leadership team. 
However, once a large number of local, state, and federal resources begin 
arriving on-scene about 12-24 hours after the incident, under this model, the IC will 
morph into a Unified Area Command comprised of two primary Unified Commands: 
Law Enforcement and Security and Health/Medical and Environmental.  Establishing 
separate Unified Commands seemed a rational approach since forming separate Branches 
or Units under one single UC might present span-of-control problems given the hundreds 
of individuals that will likely just be working environmental health issues as part of the 
FRMAC. 
Forming one of the core elements of the tactical or field level response 
under the Unified Area Command is the Health/Medical and Environmental Unified 
Command.  All of the local, state, and federal radiological response teams and assets 
                                                 
79 This meeting was conducted at the DOE Region 8 Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) team 
offices in Richland, Washington, and was attended by the author representing FEMA Region 10, the DOE 
Region 8 RAP Team leader and co-leader and three other DOE-Hanford officials, and two On-Scene 
Coordinators (OSC) from the EPA Region 10 office. The TOPOFF-4 exercise to be conducted in October, 
2007, is the next in the series of DHS TOPOFF exercises which will occur in three venues: Guam, Phoenix, 
and Portland, Oregon.  The scenario for the Portland venue will involve an RDD detonation in the city of 
Portland.  Because of this, it seemed like an appropriate opportunity to attempt to develop a Unified 
Incident Command structure for the exercise that might also serve as a model for any RDD (or IND) 
incident that may occur within the United States. 
80 Participants at this November 29, 2006, follow-on meeting at the Portland Federal Building 
included the author (representing FEMA) and representatives from the EPA, DOE, HHS, and the U.S. 
Coast Guard. 
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would either be completely located under this UC or would have representatives assigned 
to this UC.81  The major functions of this UC in the response phase would be: 
                                                 
81 These teams and assets would include from DOE RAP Teams, the entire Federal Radiological 
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), the Radiological Emergency Assistance Center/Training 
Site (REACTS), the Consequence Management Response Team, EPA On-Scene Coordinators, Radiation 
Emergency Response Teams (RERT), the Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT), US Coast Guard 
Strike Teams, the HHS Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR), Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 
(DMAT), Disaster Mortuary Teams (DMORT), National Medical Response Teams (NMRT), National 
Guard Civil Support Teams (CSTs), a number of DoD WMD response teams, plus state and local public 
health and hazardous materials teams.  
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Figure 2.   Simplified Model of a Unified Command Incident Management Structure for 
an IND/RDD Response at the Full-Integration Level 
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• Medical triage 
• Medical treatment of contaminated patients 
• Medical surge assistance 
• Dose assessment 
• Development of Protective Action Recommendations 
• Implementing Protective Action Recommendations 
• Field data coordination and interpretation 
• Mass decontamination of people 
• Mass decontamination of vehicles 
• Isotope identification 
• Delineating the extent of contamination 
• Coordinating with the IMAAC on plume predictive models 
The other core response element would be the Law Enforcement and 
Security Unified Command.  This command would be comprised of all the law 
enforcement personnel whose mission in an RDD/IND response would be to provide 
security for the impacted area, coordinate and man traffic and access control points, assist 
the public with evacuation away from the impacted area, and assist with the crime scene 
investigation. 
Both the Health/Medical and Environmental Unified Command and the 
Law Enforcement and Security Unified Command would report to the Area Unified 
Command.  The mission of this Unified Area Command would be to: Coordinate the 
development and ensure the implementation of Protective Action Recommendations (i.e., 
sheltering or evacuation of citizens); Ensure the health and safety of first responders; 
Receive and process requests for resource support and assistance from the two Unified 
Commands and forward these requests on to the local and state EOC; and, Serve as a 




serving in the Joint Field Office (JFO) in matters relating to situation reports and 
response planning and procedures germane to specific Emergency Support Functions 
(ESFs). 
Of course, there are innumerable complexities regarding the interaction 
between the two Unified Commands, the Area Unified Command and the various Multi-
Agency Coordination Centers like the EOCs, the JFO, and the FBI-led Joint Operations 
Center (JOC).  Likewise the interaction within the Unified Commands to include the 
organization of the command group sections (e.g., operations, planning, logistics, and 
administration/finance) and the coordination between these sections is replete with 
complexities that, given the policy-oriented nature of this section, will not be elucidated 
upon in this research.   
While this model UC template has yet to be fully vetted by all TOPOFF-4 
exercise participants, it does provide a starting-point for the DNPO and all levels of 
government to build upon.  It is recommended that, if utilized during TOPOFF-4, this 
model UC structure should be thoroughly scrutinized in the exercise AAR.  If found to 
have merit by whatever metrics it is being evaluated against, the model should then be 
included in the “National Plan of Record” for an RDD and IND response currently being 
developed by the National Preparedness Task Force (NPTF). 
5. Develop a Radiological Preparedness “Sister Cities” Initiative 
Since its inception over 25 years ago, communities surrounding commercial 
nuclear power plants have consistently drilled every facet of large-scale radiological 
emergency response operations under the auspices of the Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness (REP) program.   Under the REP Program, communities within the 10-mile 
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a commercial nuclear power plant are required to 
conduct a full-scale “Plume” response exercise biannually, as well as frequent hospital 
Medical Drills, Emergency Worker and Assistance Center monitoring and 
decontamination drills, radiological isotope detection Laboratory Drills, and agricultural 
“Ingestion” Exercises.  They also must produce and periodically review comprehensive 
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radiological emergency response plans and procedures.82  These regular exercises 
coupled with mandated radiological emergency response planning and a sophisticated 
training regimen make REP communities uniquely qualified to assist non-REP 
communities with their nuclear/radiological preparedness programs.  
While there are 65 nuclear power plants in the United States, the vast majority of 
America’s largest cities are not located within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone 
(EPZ) of one of these plants, and therefore, do not participate in, nor benefit, from the 
REP program.  In fact as highlighted in Chapter IV, Table 5, a full 77% of the 
respondents representing America’s largest cities, do not participate in REP Exercises.  
To address this gap, FEMA should create a radiological preparedness “Sister Cities” 
initiative that would link a non-REP UASI community with a nearby community that 
participates in the REP program.83  The goals of this “Sister Cities” Initiative would be: 
• To provide opportunities for local emergency management officials and 
other first responders from major cities and UASI areas to observe, 
evaluate, or participate in periodic REP drills and exercises; 
• To provide opportunities for emergency management and other first 
responders from 10-mile EPZ REP communities to travel to non-REP 
major cities and UASI areas to assist these communities in radiological 
response planning, training, and exercise design and implementation; 
• To create a stimulating environment where REP and non-REP UASI 
communities can exchange ideas and best practices with one another 
regarding all components of large-scale radiological response operations; 
and, 
• Through these relationships develop radiological response mutual aid 
agreements between REP and non-REP UASI “sister-city” communities.  
Such agreements would formalize the process for providing a host of 
support resources from the non-REP UASI community to the REP 
community during a nuclear power plant emergency, and, conversely, 
from a REP community to a non-REP UASI community in the aftermath 
of an RDD/IND attack in the UASI community.   
                                                 
82 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. 71. 
83 “Sister Cities” is a term developed by Sister Cities International, a nonprofit organization that links 
together U.S. cities with international cities to promote cultural understanding and foster economic 
development opportunities at http://www.sister-cities.org/sci/aboutsci/mission. 
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To bring this initiative to fruition, FEMA should provide the Nuclear and 
Radiological Preparedness Officers (NRPOs) and RRAC Chairs in each FEMA Region 
with a dedicated funding stream to pay for the travel of REP and non-REP UASI 
emergency management and other officials to each other’s respective communities.  The 
creation of a radiological preparedness “Sister Cities” program would enable emergency 
management officials in America’s largest cities to refine or even jump-start their 
nuclear/radiological terrorism preparedness and response planning efforts by providing 
them with insight into decades of lessons learned by REP program communities in 
radiological response planning, training, and exercising.  
6. Bringing it all Together: Forging a National Framework for Nuclear 
and Radiological Disaster Preparedness 
The preceding recommendations in this section each represent a piece of a larger 
mosaic – the creation of a national government strategic organizational structure to 
prepare our nation for the consequences of a nuclear or radiological weapons attack.  
Figure 3 graphically depicts this proposed national framework for nuclear and 
radiological disaster preparedness beginning with the formation of the multi-agency 
Domestic Nuclear Preparedness Office (DNPO) within DHS and extending down through 
the new FEMA Headquarters Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism Preparedness Section, on 
to the FEMA Regional Nuclear and Radiological Preparedness Officers and RRAC 
Chairs, and ultimately to the primary customer: state and local emergency management, 
homeland security, and first responder officials.   
At every level of this national radiological preparedness framework, key linkages 
with current federal government preparedness and response organizations such as the 
Office of Grants and Training within DHS/FEMA, the Emergency Management Institute, 
the National Response and Regional Response Coordination Centers, and the soon-to-be-
formed Regional Advisory Councils will be forged and strengthened.  The creation of 
these federal radiological preparedness organizational structures will also help to achieve 
the DHS National Priorities of “Expanded Regional Collaboration”, “Strengthened 
Information Sharing and Collaboration”, and “Strengthened CBRNE Detection, 
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Response, and Decontamination capabilities.”84  While this national framework for 
nuclear and radiological preparedness will not stop an RDD or IND attack from 
occurring, it will help to minimize its impacts through the creation of an integrated local-
state-federal RDD/IND disaster preparedness and response system. 
                                                 
84 Department of Homeland Security.  State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy, Guidance 
on Aligning Strategies with the National Preparedness Goal (Washington D.C.: July 22, 2005). 
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Figure 3: The Proposed National Framework for Nuclear and Radiological Disaster 
Preparedness from an Emergency Management Perspective 
Note: Bold font represents the newly proposed organizations outlined in Chapter VI, Section A. 
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B. DEVELOP OUTREACH PRODUCTS ON RDD/IND RESPONSE 
OPERATIONS GEARED TOWARDS THE LOCAL EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT OFFICIAL 
Based on the results of the survey to emergency management directors on 
RDD/IND preparedness and response information needs presented in Chapter IV, this 
section provides specific recommendations on RDD/IND planning, training, and exercise 
outreach products or activities that should be produced or undertaken by the federal 
government.  Ideally, the new DNPO as highlighted in Section A of this chapter would 
coordinate the development of these tactical outreach products and activities.  Short of 
the creation of the DNPO, it is recommended that either the FRPCC review these 
recommendations, and if found to have merit, create subcommittees or “task” committee 
member agencies to accomplish these assignments, or individual agencies like DOE or 
FEMA should take on the development of these recommendations on their own.  Since 
precise ownership of the following recommendations is difficult to proscribe, the term 
“federal government” is used throughout this section to denote general responsibility. 
1. Publish a Guidebook for Emergency Managers on Responding to an 
RDD/IND Attack 
When asked to identify the form that RDD/IND preparedness and response 
information should be presented, emergency managers rated “brief guidebooks” as their 
first choice.  Given this, and the overwhelming desire by emergency managers to receive 
information on the “big-picture” components of a post-RDD/IND attack response, the 
federal government should work to produce a concise guidebook on Responding to a 
Nuclear or Radiological Terror Attack geared specifically towards the emergency 
manager.   
To again meet the desires of emergency managers, the guidebook should be non-
technical in nature and touch-upon each of the discrete components of an RDD/IND 
response (see Chapter IV, Tables 7 and 10, respectively).  Based on the findings of this 
research, particular attention should be paid to the following: 
• Protective action decision-making – Highlight the conditions under which 
sheltering-in-place and the evacuation of citizens is most appropriate. 
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•  Plume predictive modeling – Provide an overview of the procedures for 
requesting plume models from the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric 
Assessment Center (IMAAC) within DHS, and information on how these 
models are to be interpreted. 
• Public information messages – Provide some best-practice examples of 
public alert messages used by communities for radiological emergencies 
(see Section B-5 of this chapter on risk communication guidance). 
• Types and functions of the various federal civilian and DoD radiological 
response teams – Provide a comprehensive listing of all federal 
radiological response teams and assets to include the number of personnel, 
equipment, and time on scene once notified. 
• Unified Command – Provide examples of a nuclear/radiological disaster 
incident command structure that integrates local, state, and federal field 
responders and management staff (see Section A-4 of this chapter). 
2. Provide RDD/IND Emergency Operations Planning Assistance 
Almost a quarter of the communities that participated in this research have neither 
a radiological response incident annex as part of their Emergency Operations Plans 
(EOP) or a stand-alone radiological response plan.  Of the remaining communities that do 
have a radiological response plan, there is currently no way to address their efficacy.  
Therefore, the following radiological emergency response planning assistance should be 
pursued: 
a. Develop Radiological Disaster Emergency Planning Guidance 
The federal government should develop planning guidance for local 
communities on radiological emergency response operations.  Such a planning guidance 
document already exists for REP communities, and could easily be modified from its 
present fixed-nuclear facility orientation to an RDD/IND terrorist point of reference.  
Such a model planning document would meet the intent of the recently released 
“Nationwide Plan Review, Phase 2 Report” which charges the federal government to 
“provide the leadership, doctrine, policies, guidance, standards and resources to build a 
shared national homeland security planning system.”85 
 
                                                 
85 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review, Phase 2 Report.  June 16, 2006. xi. 
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b. Conduct Radiological Response Plan Reviews   
The federal government in cooperation with state emergency management 
offices and state health and/or environmental offices should conduct a comprehensive 
review of the emergency radiological response plans of each Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) regions in the United States.  Although DHS just completed a 
Nationwide Plan Review of the EOPs of all fifty states and the UASI cities, that Review 
focused primarily on evacuation planning and other functional annexes to state and local 
EOPs, but did not involve reviews of incident annexes like radiological response plans.86 
This review of UASI radiological response plans should be conducted by joint-teams 
comprised of experts in the various fields of radiological emergency response.  Aside 
from DOE FRMAC officials, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program staff 
at the local, state, and federal level as well as REP contractors should also be part of these 
teams.  Many of these staff and contractors have extensive experience in preparing and 
reviewing radiological response plans for communities surrounding fixed nuclear power 
facilities and could provide tremendous insight in the review of UASI radiological 
response plans.  
c. Provide Planning Technical Assistance 
Communities that are found to have deficient radiological emergency 
response plans as part of the aforementioned plan review should be afforded the 
opportunity to receive technical planning assistance from the federal government.  The 
federal government should make available the services of a cadre of radiological planning 
experts to provide technical assistance, at no-charge, to local communities that are 
building their own radiological response incident annexes and plans.  Recently the DHS 
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has begun a pilot initiative called 
Radiological Community Preparedness Resource (RadCPR) that appears to meet this 
need.  The purpose of the RadCPR initiative is to work with select communities over an 
intensive six to eight-month period to help them build radiological response plans and 
                                                 
86 Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review, Phase 2 Report.  June 16, 2006. xi. 
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playbooks and identify equipment needs.87  This initiative is being piloted in Portland, 
Oregon, in early 2007.  The program should be evaluated and if successful, it should be 
institutionalized and expanded to other UASI communities. 
3. Conduct Regional RDD/IND Briefings and Table-Top Exercises 
Based on the desires of emergency management directors for full-day briefings 
and their disappointment in not interacting more frequently with federal officials 
(Chapter IV, Tables 11 and 12, respectively), the federal government should develop a 
one-day briefing on RDD/IND response operations specifically for emergency managers 
in America’s largest urban areas.  Ideally, the radiological response guidebook and/or 
planning guidance recommended above would be developed first, thus enabling these 
one-day briefings to be based on the information found in these documents.  
In addition, since two-thirds of emergency managers have not participated in a 
radiological response exercise in the past five years, and since most emergency managers 
would welcome a Table-Top Exercise (TTX) as a means of receiving information on 
RDD/IND response operations (Chapter IV, Table 11), FEMA and DOE should co-
develop a brief TTX on large-scale radiological response operations geared towards the 
local emergency manager.  Again, this TTX should be of limited duration (perhaps no 
longer than one-day) and focus on the decisions and actions that emergency managers 
would need to take in the first critical hours and days following an RDD/IND attack.  To 
be efficient, these TTXs could occur the day after the aforementioned full-day briefing on 
RDD/IND response operations.  This would allow emergency managers to hear the 
“school-book solution” prior to delving into the table-top discussion the following day. 
4. Develop an RDD/IND Response Training Course for the Emergency 
Management Official 
As shown in Chapter IV, Table 10, the number one priority for emergency 
managers is to receive information on the “big-picture” of RDD/IND response 
operations.  However, as discussed in Chapter I, Section D, the training courses currently 
                                                 
87 Brooke Buddemeier, “Radiological Community Preparedness Resource (RadCPR).” Power-point 
presentation, Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate. September 1, 2006.  
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offered by the federal government for emergency managers are predominately general 
WMD courses dealing with incident command issues or other command-and-control type 
topics.  The few courses that are geared specifically to radiological response operations 
only address a few discreet components like the treatment of contaminated individuals or 
radiological monitoring.  A single course that addresses all of the elements of a large-
scale radiological response operation that an emergency manager would have to 
coordinate simply does not exist.  
Therefore, to close this gap between the current state of radiological training 
courses for emergency managers and the type of training courses that emergency 
managers actually want, FEMA in cooperation with DOE, EPA, HHS and others should 
develop a comprehensive course on large-scale radiological response operations targeted 
at emergency management officials.  This course would provide an overview of all the 
components of an RDD/IND response that an emergency management official would 
either have to directly lead or tangentially coordinate to include: developing Protective 
Action Recommendations (PARs); crafting public information messages; ensuring first 
responder safety; establishing victim reception centers; integrating with the numerous 
federal radiological response teams; understanding the health and biological effects of 
radiation; understanding basic radiation terms and measurements; managing 
decontamination operations; requesting and analyzing plume predictive models; 
providing resources for the medical treatment of contaminated victims; overseeing 
radiological survey and monitoring operations; understanding the various types of 
dosimetry and survey equipment; and developing agricultural advisories. 
To appeal more readily to emergency managers, this course should be offered by 
federal training institutions familiar to the emergency management community like the 
Emergency Management Institute (EMI) in Emmitsburg, Maryland, or the Center for 




5. Develop a Nuclear and Radiological Disaster Risk Communications 
Guidance Document 
a. The Challenge of Fear 
One of the most difficult challenges that emergency management officials 
will face in the aftermath of an RDD or IND attack is controlling public fear.  Unlike a 
natural disaster or even a terrorist attack with conventional explosives, an RDD or IND 
attack would add the insidious threat of ionizing radiation.  Even long after the event 
those that think that they might have been exposed to radiation will experience terrible 
anxiety and feelings of a lack of control.88   
People fear ionization radiation because it cannot be seen or felt.  In a 
recent public poll 41% of Americans believe it is unsafe to be exposed to even tiny 
amounts of radiation like one might receive during a dental x-ray; and 39% believe that 
radiation cannot be detected or easily monitored.89  In short, “because it is such an 
unknown, radiation stimulates worst-case fantasies” in the minds of many citizens.90  
These statistics do not bode well for an emergency management community whose goal 
will be to calm public fears following an RDD or IND attack.91 
Despite these challenges, research from many prior large-scale disasters 
indicate that “in times of disaster, panic may be ‘iatrogenic’; that is the actions of 
emergency managers may determine the extent and duration of panic, the extent that it 
exists.”92 If the goal then is to reduce public fear and panic in the immediate aftermath of  
 
                                                 
88 Department of Homeland Security, Working Group on Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) 
Preparedness, Medical Preparedness and Response Sub-Group. May 1, 2003. 33. 
89 Bisconti Research, National USA Public Opinion Survey conducted in 2001 and quoted by Robert 
Long in a power-point presentation entitled, “Public Acceptance of Nuclear Power: What Can We Do to 
Get It?” delivered to the Nuclear Energy Institute conference in 2006. 
90 DHS, Working Group on RDD. 33. 
91 Fortunately, emergency managers recognize this challenge.  In this research when asked to prioritize 
the delivery of information that the federal government should provide them on RDD/IND response 
operations, “Fear Management” was rated 4 out of the 15 presented elements (See, Chapter IV, Table 10). 
92 Thomas A. Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a 
City against Panic.”  Clinical Infectious Disease. (Washington D.C.: Infectious Disease Society of 
America, 2002). 218. 
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an RDD/IND attack, and emergency managers can make a difference in controlling this 
fear and panic, what should the federal government do to assist emergency managers with 
this fear-management mission? 
b. Fulfilling an Established Need 
Within the past few years there have been a number of reports on 
radiological and nuclear preparedness that have called on the federal government to 
create some form of a public communications strategy for the consequences of an RDD 
or IND attack.  For instance, in their 2006 Report entitled The U.S. and Nuclear 
Terrorism, Physicians for Social Responsibility called on DHS to “establish a plan for 
communicating evacuation and sheltering decisions to the public and educate the public 
in advance about these (radiological disaster) issues.”93  The Medical Preparedness and 
Response Sub-Group of the DHS Working Group on RDD Preparedness dedicated 
several chapters of their 2003 report to ideas for managing the psychological 
consequences after an RDD/IND event.94  In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences 
completed a comprehensive study on various strategies to ameliorate the psychological 
consequences of terrorism including recommendations for the development of risk 
communication strategies.95   Finally, the recently released report by the DHS S&T 
Directorate on radiological emergency preparedness recommends that “a communications 
strategy should be built by DHS that provides resources to a variety of government 
agencies to help them develop a coherent approach and needed tools for communicating 
with the public and the media” about RDD events.96  
Despite these recommendations and the fact that emergency managers are 
highly desirous of information on how to craft public messages following a RDD/IND 
                                                 
93 Ira Helfand, Andy Kanter, Michael McCally, Kimberly Robert, Jaya Tiwari, The U.S. and Nuclear 
Terrorism. (Washington D.C.: Physicians for Social Responsibility, August 2006). 27. 
94 DHS, Working Group on RDD. 33-50. 
95 Adrienne S. Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, Preparing for the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy (Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press, 
2003). 118. 
96 Department of Homeland Security, Radiological Community Preparedness: Identifying Needs and 
Resources. (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2006). 12. 
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attack,97 the federal government has only produced rudimentary RDD/IND risk 
communication information predominately geared towards the general public and mostly 
found on government agency web sites.98  Comparatively little information on RDD/IND 
risk communications has been developed that is focused specifically on the emergency 
management community or other public officials.99  One reason for this lack of 
sophisticated RDD/IND risk communication and fear management strategies and 
guidance for public officials, despite report-after-report urging its development, could be 
attributed to the lack of a dedicated office or unit within the federal government to lead 
and coordinate this effort (one of the fundamental arguments of the first section of this 
chapter calling for the establishment of a Domestic Nuclear Preparedness Office 
(DNPO).  
However, given the obvious need, as a first-step, the newly created DNPO 
should pursue the development of a Nuclear and Radiological Disaster Risk 
Communications Guidance document for emergency management, homeland security, 
and public health officials to assist them in developing both pre- and post-event 
approaches and tools for communicating with the public and the media following a 
radiological or nuclear weapons attack.  
During a large-scale radiological emergency, communications with the 
media and public must occur immediately.  Messages also need to be consistent, since 
both the public and the media will be especially conscious of any inconsistencies in the 
information they receive from public authorities.  Therefore it is imperative for the 
emergency manager to have a suite of pre-crafted message templates that can be quickly 
modified and broadcasted.  Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program 
                                                 
97 In this research when asked to rank the level of importance of receiving information on 15 different 
components of a large-scale radiological response, emergency managers from America’s largest cities rated 
“developing public information messages” as their third highest priority (See Chapter IV, Table 10). 
98 Many federal government agencies host radiological emergency response instructions including 
FEMA at http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/radiological_dispersion_device.shtm, and DHS at 
http://www.ready.gov/america/radiation.html.  
99 Some information on the topic does exist on the DHS Lessons Learned Information Sharing site, but 
most is geared towards first responders and incident scene panic reduction not on the larger issues 
surrounding public fear management.  See 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/DynamicPage.cfm?pageTitle=rdd%20v3.0. 
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communities which surround commercial nuclear plants have developed a host of pre-
scripted messages for the public and the media in the event of a radiological emergency 
in their respective communities.  This information developed by a number of 
communities and refined over the past decades could serve as a tremendous resource for 
this Risk Communications Guidance publication.  Some of the model or template 
information that could be included in this document includes: evacuation and route 
movement instructions; shelter-in-place instructions; information on the health effects of 
radiation; mass-sheltering locations and actions; monitoring and decontamination 
locations and procedures; self-administered basic decontamination procedures; 
agricultural advisories for farmers and gardeners; instructions for schools and other 
special populations; media briefing materials and tips for effectively utilizing the media 
at various stages of the response; psychological first aid techniques; and re-entry and 
return information. 
Providing emergency managers with concrete examples of various public 
messages and media advisories to be used both before and after an RDD/IND event will 
enable emergency management professionals to craft nuclear/radiological risk 
communication plans and procedures tailored to the needs of their respective 
communities.  These risk communications plans will aid emergency managers in 
providing consistent and timely information to the public in the immediate aftermath of 
an IND or RDD attack thereby engendering public trust, reducing fear, and increasing 
compliance with protective action instructions.  This, in turn, will create an environment 
conducive to faster individual and community psychological recovery once the crisis has 
passed.100   
                                                 
100 Butler et al, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, 122. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research could be expanded upon in a variety of ways.  First, this research 
focused narrowly on the nuclear and radiological preparedness and response needs of 
emergency managers in America’s largest cities.  While big city emergency managers 
would shoulder the brunt of coordinating a response to an RDD/IND attack, emergency 
managers in surrounding suburban and outlying jurisdictions would also play a crucial 
role in and RDD/IND response through mutual-aid support and/or by directly 
coordinating actions within their own communities should they be affected by the 
radioactive plume or be impacted by evacuees and contaminated victims fleeing the 
urban core.  Future researchers may want to examine the knowledge and expectations of 
emergency managers in suburban UASI areas regarding RDD/IND response operations. 
Another potential area of future research might involve conducting actual tests of 
emergency manager’s knowledge of large-scale radiological response operations instead 
of asking these professionals to self-report on their knowledge as this research did.  
Having quantifiable data on what emergency managers know (or do not know) regarding 
large-scale radiological response operations may better aid in the development of 
radiological preparedness publications and training courses. 
This research also focused exclusively on organizational structures and 
educational outreach actions that the federal government should undertake to help 
prepare local emergency management officials for their roles in managing the 
consequences of nuclear and radiological terrorism.  Of course, various state agencies and 
departments play a significant role in preparing both themselves and local communities 
for radiological disasters.  Future studies might want to explore ways that state 
emergency management offices could improve their radiological preparedness services to 
other state agencies and local cities and counties.   
Another intriguing area of study which this research only rudimentarily addressed 
is radiological “fear management”.  Future researchers may want to conduct a more in-
depth analysis of pre-event psychological anxiety and post-event trauma as it relates to 
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radiological disasters, and how this information could assist emergency management, 
homeland security, and public health officials develop tangible strategies to minimize 
these negative psychological affects.  
Furthermore, studies on the readiness of other critical disciplines to respond 
effectively to an RDD/IND attack could also be pursued.  For example, are medical 
doctors and nurses at trauma centers and hospitals in America’s largest cities adequately 
equipped or trained to monitor, decontaminate and treat hundreds or thousands of people 
in the aftermath an RDD/IND attack?  What about local public affairs offices?  Are they 
ready to quickly stand-up joint information centers to begin coordinating post-attack 
messages to the public in concert with their state and federal agency counterparts?  What 
sort of information and training do public affairs officers need to effectively integrate and 
carry-out their post-radiological terrorism responsibilities?  Finally, what about the 
various critical infrastructure sectors’ abilities to respond to a nuclear or radiological 
disaster?  Electric utility crews, water and wastewater management officials, telephone 
line repair personnel, and many other private or semi-private critical infrastructure 
workers would be essential to maintaining the crucial services that underpin civil society 
following an RDD/IND attack.  How will these workers respond to an RDD/IND attack?  
What sort of training do these workers receive from their respective employers on 
radiological protective actions?  Can they be relied upon to perform their essential duties 
following a nuclear/radiological terrorist attack?  If not, what can the emergency 
management community do to assist critical infrastructure sectors prepare for the 








Several years ago a panel of national security experts convened as part of the 
Hart-Rudman Commission rated nuclear terrorism as the single biggest threat to 
America’s physical and future economic security.  To combat this threat the federal 
government established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) via the 
promulgation of a Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) to oversee an 
impressive joint, inter-agency effort to detect illicit nuclear materials and keep them from 
entering the United States.  However, the federal government has made no provision to 
establish a similar joint-oversight office to coordinate the consequences of a nuclear or 
radiological attack should the detection efforts of the DNDO fail.  In short, while the 
prevention side of nuclear terrorism, through the DNDO, has a clear mandate, a joint-
agency organizational super-structure, and dedicated funding, the preparedness side of 
nuclear terrorism remains devoid of direction, is organizationally fragmented, and 
financially unacknowledged. 
To address this preparedness gap the federal government should pursue a host of 
strategic organizational remedies chief amongst which is the promulgation of a new 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) that establishes a Domestic Nuclear 
Preparedness Office (DNPO) within DHS.  Like the DNDO, the DNPO would be a joint, 
multi-agency office that would bring together all the disparate agencies of the federal 
government that are currently working on some aspect of radiological and nuclear 
preparedness.  The DNPO would provide leadership, direction, and, moreover, dedicated 
staff to oversee the creation of a sophisticated nuclear and radiological preparedness 
planning, training, and exercise regimen for the emergency management, homeland 
security, and first responder communities of the country.  Other organizational solutions 
to this nuclear preparedness gap should include the creation of a Nuclear/Radiological 
Preparedness Section within FEMA, the revitalization of the currently existing nuclear 
power plant-focused Regional Radiological Assistance Committees (RRACs), and the 
creation of a model Unified Command incident management structure to be used by 
local, state, and federal responders during an RDD/IND disaster response.   
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At the tactical level, the federal government, through the DNPO, must work to 
increase the proficiency level of those charged with managing the response to an 
RDD/IND attack – principally the local emergency management directors in America’s 
largest cities.  With the end of the Cold War and the termination of the federal 
government’s post nuclear-attack Civil Defense programs in the 1980s, much of the 
knowledge of nuclear/radiological response operations has been lost as a new generation 
of emergency managers, reared on natural disasters, has taken charge.  With the specter 
of an RDD or IND terrorist attack or rogue-nation nuclear weapons strike increasingly 
plausible, it is time for the federal government to once again invest the resources to make 
emergency managers proficient in radiological response operations.  This should not be a 
tough sell.  As this research has highlighted, emergency managers concede that their 
knowledge of large-scale radiological response operations is lacking, and they recognize 
the importance of increasing their skills in this arena.   
To accomplish the goal of raising the proficiency level of emergency managers in 
regards to managing a large-scale radiological response, the newly established DNPO 
should pursue the development of a suite of RDD/IND preparedness and response 
outreach products geared specifically towards the emergency manager to include: the 
development of a concise guidebook; the creation of a series of joint briefings or 
workshops; the development of a one-day Table-Top Exercise (TTX); the publication of 
radiological response planning guidance; the establishment of a cadre of experts to 
provide technical radiological planning assistance; and the development of a 
comprehensive training course on the many components of large-scale radiological 
response operations.  
In conclusion, the United States is engaged in a global war on terrorism, but 
despite dire warnings from federal agencies, private think-tanks, and independent 
commissions about the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorist attacks occurring on 
American soil, the American federal government has yet to develop a comprehensive, 
national approach to preparing our cities and states for the consequences of such an 
attack.  Hopefully, the strategic organizational approaches and tactical, field-level 
outreach recommendations presented in this research can provide the impetus towards 
91 
building an integrated, national, nuclear and radiological disaster emergency 
preparedness system for our country; a system that will not stop a nuclear or radiological 
weapons attack from occurring, but will help to ameliorate the tremendous loss of life, 
social panic, and direct and indirect economic impacts caused by such an attack. 
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APPENDIX – “OTHER” RESPONSES 
Open-ended question from the survey: What assistance do you foresee requiring 
from the federal government following an RDD/IND event in your community? (N=24) 
 
1. “Primary assistance needed is support of EMPG funding to provide adequately 
trained emergency management personnel at the local level.” 
2. “Expert first responders, decon, recovery, financial assistance.” 
3. “Providing instruction and information to 1st responders on a regular ongoing 
basis and the same for myself (EM Director).” 
4. “Flyover to determine extent of plume, technical assistance in decontamination, 
medical care, and related issues.” 
5. “We are lucky in we have a RAP Team on-site, plus lots of expertise.  Some 
technicians have attended NTS training, but most policy folks don’t have the 
time.” 
6. “Assistance in the form of response and recovery, clean-up, and apprehension of 
the perpetrator.” 
7. “Assistance with direction and control and technical assistance.” 
8. “Technical support.” 
9. “Monitoring; helping identify ‘how clean is clean’; helping with fear 
management; placing a relative value on the contamination/exposure; financial 
assistance for victims; funding for clean-up efforts.” 
10. “Assessment and recommendations on evacuation, long-term ecological impact 
and long-term public health impact.  Operational assistance for quarantine and 
clean-up of medical support for hospitals.” 
11. “Realistic planning scenarios/exercises that we can prepare for in our area.” 
12. “It would depend on the scope of the event. There would likely be a great need for 
Fed resources, particularly if the event involved our AFB.  Resources would be 
the greatest need.” 
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13. “I don’t fear an RDD/IND problem.  Our problem will be an explosive in the 
downtown area.” 
14. “Clean-up, decon, relocation, economic revitalization, etc.” 
15. “As per NIMS/SENS models.” 
16. “Representation in the EOC and direct communications with local government.” 
17. “Tech assistance, response teams, human services, public assistance, medical 
support, transportation support.” 
18. “Monitoring and survey, mass casualty / NDMS, security assistance, sheltering, 
recovery assistance.” 
19. “Significant.” 
20. “A Rad/Nuc incident would involve dozens of local, state, and federal agencies.  
Need help in coordinating all of that into a coherent response.  My biggest fear is 
a massive technical “cluster” among the government “experts” resulting in slow 
and difficult policy and strategic decision-making processes.” 
21. “Recovery.” 
22. “Money and man-power.” 
23. “Appropriate NRP assistance from local and mainland federal agencies.” 
24. “Federal teams will be needed to assist; we will be overwhelmed.” 
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